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Palavras-chave codificac¸a˜o de rede, aleato´rio codificac¸a˜o linear de rede, XOR codificac¸a˜o de
rede, ataque a poluic¸a˜o de dados, ataque poluic¸a˜o Tag, redes sem fio
Resumo O assunto abordado nesta tese prende-se em como obter seguranc¸a eficiente
contra ataques por poluic¸a˜o, explorando a estrutura de Codificac¸a˜o de Rede
(CR).
Recentemente, tem havido interesse crescente no uso de te´cnicas
de codificac¸a˜o de rede com o intuito de aumentar a robustez e o ritmo
de transfereˆncia de dados de redes e reduzir o atraso nas redes sem
fios, em que uma rede de esquema baseado na codificac¸a˜o aproveita a
natureza aditiva dos sinais sem fios, permitindo que dois no´s transmitam
simultaneamente para o no´ de retransmissa˜o. No entanto, as redes sem fio
activadas para CR sa˜o suscept´ıveis a ameac¸a seguranc¸a severa, conhecida
como ataque por poluic¸a˜o de dados, onde um no´ malicioso injecta na rede
polu´ıda (i.e., corrompidos) pacotes que impedem os no´s de destino de
descodificar correctamente. Devido a` recodificac¸a˜o nos no´s intermedia´rios,
de acordo com o princ´ıpio fundamental da CR, os pacotes polu´ıdos
propagam-se rapidamente nos outros pacotes leg´ıtimos corrompidos,
levando a um desperd´ıcio de recursos de rede. Assim, uma se´rie de
investigac¸o˜es veˆm sendo dedicadas a mecanismos de combate aos ataques
de poluic¸a˜o dados. Os esquemas baseados em Co´digo de Autenticac¸a˜o de
Mensagem Homomo´rfica (MAC) sa˜o uma soluc¸a˜o promissora de combate
a ataques por poluic¸a˜o dados. No entanto, a maior parte destes sa˜o
sens´ıveis a um novo tipo de ataque por poluic¸a˜o, chamado de ataque
de poluic¸a˜o de etiqueta (Tag Attacck Pollution), onde um no´ adversa´rio
modifica aleatoriamente etiquetas anexados ao final dos pacotes transmitidos.
Portanto, nesta tese, primeiro propomos um esquema de autenticac¸a˜o
mensagem homomo´rfica baseado no co´digo, proporcionando resisteˆncia
contra ataques por poluic¸a˜o de dados e ataques por poluic¸a˜o de etiqueta em
redes sem fio baseados em esquemas NC-XOR. Para ale´m disso, propomos
quatro esquemas baseados na codificac¸a˜o de mensagens de autenticac¸a˜o
homomorficas, que fornecem resisteˆncia contra ataques por poluic¸a˜o de
mensagens e de etiquetas na Codificac¸a˜o de Rede Linear Aleato´rio (RLNC).
Nossos resultados mostram que os esquemas que propostos sa˜o mais
eficientes em comparac¸a˜o com outros esquemas imunes a` poluic¸a˜o de
etiqueta em termos de complexidade, de overhead de comunicac¸a˜o e de
overhead de armazenamento da chave.

Keywords Network coding, Random linear network coding, XOR network coding,
Security, Data pollution attack, Tag pollution attack, Wireless networks
Abstract The topic of this thesis is how to achieve efficient security against pollution
attacks by exploiting the structure of network coding.
There has recently been growing interest in using network coding
techniques to increase the robustness and throughput of data networks, and
reduce the delay in wireless networks, where a network coding-based scheme
takes advantage of the additive nature of wireless signals by allowing two
nodes to transmit simultaneously to the relay node. However, Network
Coding (NC)-enabled wireless networks are susceptible to a severe security
threat, known as data pollution attack, where a malicious node injects into
the network polluted (i.e., corrupted) packets that prevent the destination
nodes from decoding correctly. Due to recoding at the intermediate nodes,
according to the core principle of NC, the polluted packets propagate
quickly into other packets and corrupt bunches of legitimate packets
leading to network resource waste. Hence, a lot of research effort has been
devoted to schemes against data pollution attacks. Homomorphic Message
Authentication Code (MAC)-based schemes are a promising solution against
data pollution attacks. However, most of them are susceptible to a new
type of pollution attack, called tag pollution attack, where an adversary
node randomly modifies tags appended to the end of the transmitted packets.
Therefore, in this thesis, we first propose a homomorphic message
authentication code-based scheme, providing resistance against data
pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled wireless
networks. Moreover, we propose four homomorphic message authentication
code-based schemes which provide resistance against data and tag pollution
attacks in Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC). Our results show that
our proposed schemes are more efficient compared to other competitive tag
pollution immune schemes in terms of complexity, communication overhead
and key storage overhead.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“You only live once, but if you do it
right, once is enough.”
Mae West
We start by giving a brief overview of Network Coding (NC) concepts used throughout
this thesis. Next, we outline the need for a secure NC approach in Wireless Networks (WNs).
Afterwards, we discuss the motivation and objectives of the thesis. Then, the organization of
this thesis is presented. Finally, we finish the chapter by providing an overview of the main
contributions of the thesis.
1.1 Introduction
There is a strong demand in modern societies for pioneering Information and Communica-
tions Technology (ICT) services that will support modern social infrastructure. In the new
urban environment model, technology is called to support citizens in terms of new paradigms of
services, tested and proved to facilitate everyday life. With the appearance of new technologies
(i.e., smart homes, smart cities, Internet of Things (IoT), smart factories, smart phones, and
etc.) and applications (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and etc.), the request for “being
connected” has been increased dramatically. This implies an increasing demand for higher
throughput and more efficient use of communication networks and developing new techniques
in the fields of wireless communication, which can be used as a base for creating smart services
that would serve people’s everyday life in modern societies.
Moreover, security concept in communications network of these technologies and applica-
tions is a crucial aspect of modern digital infrastructure. There are many aspects to security,
addressing a range of natural adversaries and malicious threats. Also in communication
networks, one of the important issues is that data remains confidential impervious to malicious
or accidental eavesdropping. Not only should communications be resistant to link failures,
unintentional interference, and natural imperfections in the transmission medium, but also
it is necessary to provide reliable, authenticated communication in the presence of malicious
tampering (where an adversary intelligently modifies transmitted signals), spoofing (adversary
attempts to impersonate a legitimate user), and jamming (adversary injects random noise to
disrupt communication). Furthermore, data integrity should be ensured.
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Recent research efforts have shown that WNs can benefit from NC technology in terms of
bandwidth, robustness to packet losses, delay and energy consumption [5–15]. However, NC
running over multi-hop networks can be vulnerable to various information security threats
such as eavesdropping and data injection/modification, also node compromising and traffic
analysis creating a need for robust security mechanisms that guarantee the security of data
distribution. Existing mechanisms rely on simple network coding operations to provide a
robust and low complexity solution. Nevertheless, the presented solutions not only are still
vulnerable to network pollution attacks but also have a lot of overhead, so these solutions are
opening the door for new research initiatives towards “secure” network coding solutions. In
order to appropriately position the key motivators and objectives for this thesis, we provide
an overview of NC that provides the benefits of NC, as well as providing the reader with an
insight towards the current vulnerabilities of secure NC-enabled wireless network.
1.2 Overview of NC
Ahlswede and his colleagues in [1], about 16 years ago, officially introduced the notion of
network coding. In contrast to traditional store-and-forward networks, the incoming packets
at the intermediate nodes in NC-enabled networks are not only routed or replicated but also
be recoded. In traditional store-and-forward schemes, each intermediate node has a set of
routing information such as a routing table that helps the node to find which paths are the
best for relaying a received data to one of the sink nodes in the network. In other words, each
intermediate node, based on the address of the final sink nodes and the information available in
its routing table, finds the best and cost effective paths. However, the policies which allow the
node to find the best paths depend on the employed routing protocol. Moreover, regardless of
the particular applied data routing protocol and the process based on which the cost function
is defined, in traditional store-and-forward schemes the incoming data is only replicated and
copied on one or more of the outgoing paths at a given intermediate node. Therefore, using
traditional store-and-forward methods, the content of each data packet remains untouched
during its travel through the network unless noise or malicious nodes injects some change
to it. Nevertheless, in NC networks, each node in the network has the ability to encode its
incoming data in order to generate its outgoing data. Hence, for each node, NC uses an
encoding function fv to generate the output packets by taking as input the packets arriving at
the node. We demonstrate the network coding operation at the node v as:
(yv1 , . . . , y
v
z ) = fv(x
v
1, . . . , x
v
d) (1.1)
where parameters z and d are the number of packets departing from and arriving at the node
v respectively.
Figure 1.1 demonstrates how the capacity of a network is improved when the NC method
is applied instead of the traditional store-forward method. In this demonstration, there are
two nodes A and B, who transmit their packets a and b to each other through an intermediate
node R, respectively. In the traditional store-forward method, A transmits its packet to R and
after that B transmits its packet to R. Afterwards, R transmits the received packet from A to
B and the received packet from B to A. On the other hand, in NC method, A and B transmit
their packets a and b in similar way to the traditional store-forward method. However, R
transmits only the XOR result of the two packets, a ⊕ b, to both A and B simultaneously.
This capability provides one transmission step less for NC method compared to the traditional
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store-forward method. The two main approaches of NC are XOR network coding and Random
Linear Network Coding (RLNC), which are discussed and explained in details in Chapter 2.
A B
R
a
a
b
b
Time slot 1
Time slot 2
Time slot 3
Time slot 4
A B
R
a
b
a+b a+b
Time slot 1
Time slot 2
Time slot 3
Figure 1.1: Traditional store-forward scheme and Network Coding examples of 3 nodes. To
exchange messages a and b between nodes A and B, these nodes need to route their packets
through node R. As it is shown on top, the traditional store-forward scheme would require
four transmissions. However, if R is allowed to perform network coding with simple XOR
operations, as illustrated in the lower diagram, a ⊕ b can be sent in one single broadcast
transmission. By combining the received data with the stored message, A and B which possess
a and b can recover b and a respectively. Thus, network coding saves one transmission.
3
1.3 Secure Network Coding
The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of wireless communications can raise many security
challenges. More precisely, NC-enabled wireless networks can be the target of a wide spectrum
of security attacks including eavesdropping attacks, Byzantine attacks, and pollution attacks
among others. In this sense, a lot of effort has been placed on secure NC schemes against
these types of attacks.
Due to the main principle of NC, according to which the intermediate nodes employ coding
operations to mix (i.e. recode) the incoming packets, the NC-enabled networks are vulnerable
to a severe security threat known as pollution attack. According to this kind of attack, an
adversary injects into the NC-enabled network polluted packets that propagate quickly into
other legitimate packets and corrupt bunches of them because of the recoding process that
take place at the intermediate nodes of the NC-enabled network. Consequently, pollution
attacks lead to network resource waste. In this sense, detection of pollution attacks is of
utmost importance for NC-enabled networks. Pollution attacks can be considered as two types:
data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks. In data pollution attacks, the adversary
targets at modifying (i.e. corrupting) the content of the transmitted packet. In tag pollution
attacks, the adversary targets at modifying the tags appended to the end of the packets. A
tag is a piece of information appended to the end of the coded packet to ensure its integrity. If
the tag polluted packet is not detected, it can travel multiple hops or even reach the sink node
leading to waste of network bandwidth. The presentation of data and tag pollution attacks is
shown in Figure 1.2, where a node s sends its packet, which includes the data and tags, to the
node R.
More precisely, in this thesis, we focus on the subject of security in network coding and
propose various schemes to provide data and tag pollution attacks resistance.
Data Tags
Packet
Data Tags
Data Tags
Packet
Data Tags
Tag polluted Packet
S R
Data polluted Packet
Figure 1.2: Data and tag pollution attacks illustrations.
We summarize the related work of secure NC schemes in Table 1.1. However, other related
work specific to each topic can be found in each chapter.
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Table 1.1: Secure network coding schemes
Attacks Adversary target Related work
Eavesdropping monitoring information [16]- [17]
Byzantine selectively dropping packets, forwarding data packets through non-optimal
or even invalid routes, generating routing loops, modifying or altering the
message in transit, changing the header of packets
[18], [19], [20]
Pollution
data pollution attacks: the adversary targets at modifying (i.e. corrupting)
the content of the transmitted packet
[2, 19–25]
tag pollution attacks: the adversary targets at modifying the tags ap-
pended to the end of the transmitted packets
[3], [4], [26]
1.4 Motivation and Objectives
Wireless networks are characterized by low communication bandwidth, packet loss and
power consumption constraints. To address these limitations, the application of Network
Coding technology in wireless networks can be a promising solution since it can provide
significant benefits including improved network capacity and robustness among others. However,
the Network Coding-enabled wireless networks are vulnerable to various types of attacks
that can compromise the security of the wireless networks. Based on that and the fact that
the security is a critical factor for the success of wireless networks, we steer our focus on
the mitigation of these types of attacks. In order to support secure data distribution over
wireless multi-hop networks, the main objective of this PhD thesis is to design advanced
security mechanisms to mitigate the impact of data corruption and protect transmission from
adversaries or other intrusions. So motivated by the above observations, in this thesis we focus
on the following objectives:
• To propose a lightweight security scheme for XOR NC based systems: a key
enabler of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is a secure communications that needs to
be robust and lightweight (in terms of complexity) to support end-to-end connectivity in
highly dynamic wireless environments. Towards this direction, XOR NC is a promising
solution for WSNs which have some limitations in terms of communication bandwidth,
reliability and power consumption. Nevertheless, XOR NC is vulnerable to pollution
attacks, where adversaries (i.e., compromised intermediate nodes) inject into the network
corrupted packets that prevent the destination nodes from decoding correctly. This has,
as a result, not only network resource waste but also energy waste at the intermediate
nodes. In this sense, pollution attack constitutes a serious threat against WSNs (i.e.,
resource-constrained wireless networks) that should be addressed in order for WSNs to
reap the benefits of XOR NC. To address this attack in XOR NC-enabled networks, a
number of schemes have been proposed so far. But most of these schemes can detect
the polluted packets only at the sinks. In this context, a key object of this thesis is to
propose an efficient lightweight scheme for XOR NC-enabled networks which can detect
the polluted packets before arriving to the sinks.
• To propose efficient security schemes for RLNC based systems: RLNC has
been shown to be particularly beneficial for guaranteeing robust communication over
dynamic wireless networks, even in the presence of disruptions such as corruption, packet
loss, and congestion. However, similar to XOR NC, RLNC is susceptible to data and tag
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pollution attacks, where an adversary (e.g., compromised intermediate node) pollutes
the data and tag components of the packets that prevent the destination nodes from
decoding it correctly. In this context, approaching an efficient security scheme for RLNC
will be a key target. To address this security attack, MACs (Message Authentication
Codes) have been proposed, but they use only a single domain tags to protect the
integrity of the data that still leaves the packet vulnerable to pollution. In this context,
a key objective is to extend this promising approach to investigate how we can provide
robustness against both data and tag pollution.
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: Principles of Security and Network Coding.
In this chapter, we present an overview of cryptography and security concept, as well as the
mathematical techniques and notation that will be used throughout this thesis. Moreover,
an overview and state-of-the-art analysis in the field of network coding is given. In order to
position our work, we review two specific models of NC systems (i.e., XOR NC and RLNC),
and the different metrics that can influence the NC system performance from a bandwidth,
delay and computational overhead perspectives.
Chapter 3: Secure Network Coding: Countermeasures and Challenges
This chapter introduces briefly the concept of security requirements of the Network Coding-
enabled WNs, as well as the vulnerability of Network Coding-enabled WNs to various types
of attacks that can compromise their security. Based on that and the fact that the security
is critical factor for the success of WNs, we steer our focus on the mitigation of these types
of attacks. In particular, we intend to provide a basis for positioning our research efforts
towards the deployment of the appropriate countermeasures against attacks targeting Network
Coding-enabled WNs.
Chapter 4: Efficient MAC-based for Secure XOR NC.
In contrast to normal network coding operated over large finite fields, XOR network coding has
gained an increasing number of applications for its simplicity, especially in wireless networks.
Existing solutions to pollution attacks mostly can protect only the normal network coding,
but a few of them are able to secure XOR network coding. This chapter proposes an efficient
Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based scheme providing resistance against pollution
attacks in XOR NC-enabled for WNs. Our proposed scheme makes use of a probabilistic key
pre-distribution and MACs (tags). In our scheme, the source appends multiple MACs (tags)
to the end of each native packet, where each MAC can authenticate only a part of the message,
and the native packet authenticated by different MACs are overlapped.
Chapter 5: The Proposed Secure RLNC Schemes
Chapter 5 includes two parts. In part I, we propose two schemes that can provide resistance
against pollution attacks. In the first proposed scheme, we present a homomorphic MAC-based
scheme, called Dual-Homomorphic MAC (Dual-HMAC), for network coding-enabled wireless
networks. The proposed scheme makes use of two types of tags (i.e., MACs and D-MACs)
to provide resistance against data pollution attacks, and partially against tag pollution at-
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tacks. Moreover, the second proposed scheme proposes an efficient Homomorphic Message
Authentication Code-based scheme, called HMAC, providing resistance against data pollution
attacks and tag pollution attacks in Network Coding-enabled Wireless Networks. In part II, we
propose two more schemes. In the third scheme, we propose a null space-based homomorphic
MAC scheme, for network coding-enabled wireless networks. Finally, in the last proposed
scheme, we present a computationally efficient null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme,
where due to its lightweight nature, it incurs minimal complexity compared to the other
related schemes.
Chapter 6: Main Contributions and Future Work.
The conclusions of the thesis, along with the outline directions for future research in this field
are summarized in this chapter.
1.6 Thesis Contribution
This PhD study mainly contributes towards providing lightweight security schemes that
improve the robustness of several network applications. We aim to (i) achieve lightweight
security using low-complexity procedures in XOR NC-enabled WNs, without adding to the
complexity of protocols, and (ii) to achieve lightweight security using low-complexity procedures
in RLNC-enabled WNs.
The main contributions and novelty of this PhD study lies in the following:
• We investigate existing techniques in the literature for network coding-enabled wireless
networks. Therefore, we focus on a survey of existing NC-enabled WNs attacks that
have potential a negative impact on the security of the whole network. Furthermore,
we present mitigation approaches against the most common attacks, and position these
categories. Our objective is to highlight the current limitations, and provide a basis on
which to build more reliable and efficient defense mechanisms against known attacks for
NC-enabled WNs.
• No such scheme was available in the open literature for XOR NC which can provide
resistance against both data and tag pollution attacks; this thesis provides an efficient
Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based scheme providing resistance against pollution
attacks in XOR NC-enabled WNs. Moreover, we propose a technique for distributing
the keys required for verification, which enables us to reduce tag pollution probability
and not allow to a polluted packet to travel many hops. Furthermore, based on the
proposed scheme and the key model applied in this scheme, we not only effectively speed
up detection probability and time complexity of verification, but also save bandwidth
overhead efficiency.
• We propose a novel homomorphic MAC scheme to address both data and tag pollution
attacks for RLNC-enabled wireless networks. In this regard, existing schemes mainly
focus on mitigating data pollution attacks, however, there exist a few related works [3], [4],
and [26] which are also resistant against tag pollution attacks. However, these have had
limited applications in wireless networks due to their high complexity. In this context,
we extend the MAC scheme to the dual domain approach to protect against data and
tag pollution. More precisely, we first introduce a scheme which uses a new idea of
exploiting two types of MACs (tags). We call the second type of MACs as Dual MAC.
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Furthermore, by adding a signature to the Dual MACs, we propose both data and tag
pollution immune scheme. According to our scheme, the former tags (i.e. MACs and
D-MACs) ensure the integrity of the packet and MACs and the latter one ensures the
integrity of the D-MACs.
• In a different approach, we also propose the efficient homomorphic MAC scheme to
promote secure NC communications. In this context, we exploit an efficient null space-
based scheme that allows us to provide additional protection against tag pollutions
from adversaries in contrast to current schemes that are either applied to linear NC,
or to computationally complex. By using null space scheme, each node has not a fixed
location in the coded packet, providing resistance against tag pollution attacks. In the
proposed scheme, the tags are calculated based on null space properties, and then they
are secretly swapped with the packet data. Hence, they are not appended to the end of
the coded packet and thus, an adversary is not able to distinguish them from the packet
data. Our results show that the proposed scheme is more efficient compared to the
schemes proposed in [3] and [4], in terms of computational complexity without incurring
additional communication overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed schemes
in [3] and [4] are the most competitive schemes in the literature for providing resistance
against tag pollution attacks in RLNC.
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Chapter 2
Principles of Security and Network
Coding
“Science never solves a problem without
creating ten more.”
George Bernard Shaw
In this chapter, we first give a brief overview of classical cryptography followed by
information-theoretic security. Then, previous works done in the field of Network Coding, as
well as the frequently used notation and definitions that will be used throughout the thesis are
introduced. Finally, a special emphasis is given to Random Linear Network Coding, where we
end this chapter by describing the decoding probability of the random linear network coding
schemes.
2.1 Security and Cryptography
Cryptography deals with the study of mathematical techniques related to information
security aspects. In this regards, the authors in [27–29] proposed a complete discussion of
cryptography where they categorize the goals of cryptography studies into five main groups:
(i) Authentication, (ii) Data confidentiality, (iii) Data integrity, (iv) Availability, and (v)
Non-repudiation. The first one, authentication, guarantees that two nodes entering into a
communication authenticate each other. Data confidentiality prevents an unauthorized entity
from accessing a data shared between authorized entities, while data integrity aims to prevent
modification of communicated data by an untrusted party. Availability ensures that any
resource is always available for any legitimate entity. Non-repudiation prevents an entity
from denying previous activities. In this thesis, we will focus on security aspect of network
coding-enabled wireless networks with relation to the data integrity.
To continue this section and introduce the terminology used thorough the thesis, we give a
generic cryptographic protocol example for exchanging messages, as follows. There are two
persons (i.e., Alice (the source) and Bob (the destination)) who want to communicate with
each other through an wireless channel (it also could be as a wired, or fiber optic medium).
The information that Alice wants to share with Bob is called the plaintext. The encrypted
plaintext that Alice actually sends to Bob is called the ciphertext. The general idea behind
11
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Figure 2.1: A general scenario of cryptography, where two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob)
wish to protect the plaintext P from an adversary Trudy who acquires the ciphertext.
any cryptosystem is that Alice and Bob must share a secret key which is used to encrypt a
message. Moreover, for maintaining the security framework between source and destination,
cryptographic techniques allow a source to conceal data so that an intruder (i.e., Trudy acts
as an intruder) can gain no information from the original data. Furthermore, the destination
must be able to recover the original data from the disguised data. Figure 2.1 illustrates a
general scenario which is used in cryptography concepts.
Generally, cryptography can be classified into symmetric-key cryptography and public-key
(asymmetric-key) cryptography. In a symmetric cryptography, all participants share the same
key which is used for both encryption and decryption. By using the same key and a decryption
algorithm, a destination can recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. In addition, there are
two broad classes of symmetric encryption techniques: block ciphers and stream ciphers [28].
The main idea in block ciphers is dividing the plaintext into some large (e.g. 128 bits) blocks,
then encoding each block separately and decoding each block by participating only the last
block and same key. Block ciphers are used in many secure Internet protocols like Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) (for secure e-mail), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (for securing Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) connections), and IPsec (for securing the network-layer transport) [28].
In other side, stream cipher divides the plaintext into small blocks (e.g. 1 bit) and encoding
each block by participating many previous blocks and different keys. The two most popular
symmetric cryptography standards are discussed briefly as follows:
• DES (Data Encryption Standard) The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been
adopted by the National Bureau of Standards in 1977. Data in DES are encrypted in
64-bit blocks and also it uses a 56-bit key. The algorithm transforms 64-bit input in
a series of steps into a 64-bit output. The same steps, with the same key, are used to
reverse the encryption.
• AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) Because of the short key, DES could not
satisfy the security requirements in practice and also considering to the very short
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estimation time of cracking key in DES, in 2001, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) introduced the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The idea is
replacement for DES as the approved standard for a wide range of applications. AES
uses 128-bit blocks and can operate with keys that are 128, 192, and 256 bits long.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in symmetric encryption, all participants need to
communicate with each other and have an agreement and share a secret key that this key
is used for encryption and decryption. Thus, how to distribute and manage keys among
legitimate participants in an efficient and secure way, is the main challenge of symmetric
cryptography technique. However, public-key cryptography method is a form of cryptosystem
in which encryption and decryption are performed using different keys: one a public key
and one a private key. The public key can be published, but the private key should be kept
secret. In public-key cryptography method, the idea is transforming plaintext into ciphertext
by using a public key and an encryption algorithm. Using the private key and a decryption
algorithm, the plaintext is recovered from the ciphertext. Suppose again the example described
in previous section, where Alice wishes to send a data message to Bob (see Figure 2.2 ). Bob
could share his public key to all nodes (legitimate nodes and attackers) and keep his private
key to himself. Then, Alice would encrypt the plaintext P using Bob’s public key puk and
send the resulting ciphertext Encpu(k)(p) to Bob. Finally, Bob uses his private key prk to
decrypt the ciphertext. The key should be large enough for it to be computationally infeasible
to derive the secret key from the public key via brute-force search. The three well-known
representatives of public-key cryptography schemes are RSA, Diffie–Hellman key exchange
and ECC [29].
• Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): RSA is one of the first practical public-key cryp-
tosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission which introduced for the first
time by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman in 1977. This scheme has since that
time reigned supreme as the most widely accepted and implemented general-purpose
approach to public-key encryption. The RSA algorithm is a block cipher in which the
plaintext and ciphertext are integers between 0 and n−1. A typical size for n is 1024 bits.
The RSA algorithm involves four steps: key generation, key distribution, encryption
and decryption. RSA involves a public key and a private key. The public key can be
known by everyone and is used for encrypting messages. The intention is that messages
encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted in a reasonable amount of time
using the private key. However, it is shown that four possible approaches to attacking
the RSA algorithm are as follows [29]:
– Brute force: This involves trying all possible private keys.
– Mathematical attacks: There are several approaches, all equivalent in effort to
factoring the product of two primes.
– Timing attacks: These depend on the running time of the decryption algorithm.
– Chosen ciphertext attacks: This type of attack exploits properties of the RSA
algorithm.
• Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHP): This protocol enables two users to establish
a secret key using a public-key scheme based on discrete logarithms. The protocol is
secure only if the authenticity of the two participants can be established.
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Figure 2.2: Public-key cryptography model.
• Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC): The key length for secure RSA use has
increased over recent years, and this has put a heavier processing load on applications
using RSA. In this regard, ECC is showing up in standardization efforts, including
the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public-Key Cryptography. The principal attraction of
ECC, compared to RSA, is that it appears to offer a smaller key size, thereby reducing
processing overhead. Accordingly, the confidence level in ECC is not yet as high as that
in RSA.
2.2 Network Coding
2.2.1 Related Works and Existing Schemes
The following brief review on some of the current works and existing schemes allows us
to provide the framework for the proposed schemes, including general assumptions and the
particular notations that are going to be used in this thesis.
According to the Max-flow Min-cut Theorem [30, 31], which proved that the max-flow
min-cut capacity of a general multicast network can only be achieved by allowing intermediate
nodes to mix different data flows, the first appearance of NC was proposed by Ahlswede
et. al [1] in 2000. After the first appearance of NC, the authors in [16] demonstrated a
model for a collection of subsets of wiretap channels for an NC system called wiretap network.
Subsequently, a solution for error correction is presented in [32]. Furthermore, a different
approach to NC proposed in [33], where an algebraic framework is derived to verify the
feasibility of the multicast problem. Afterwards, the authors in [34] modified the Max-flow
Min-cut Theorem to the problem of finding a point on an algebraic set. Moreover, the authors
proposed the multicast problem in a Linear Network Coding (LNC) scenario [34]. They also
investigated an upper and lower bound required for the alphabet size of the network codes. In
this work, the authors explained the relation between a linear dispersion and a generic network
coding. Additionally, they found a relation on the sizes of the base fields of the code. Moreover,
the theory of codes on graphs was used to provide deterministic polynomial time algorithms
and randomized algorithms for linear network coding in directed acyclic graphs [35]. They
also realized a connection between linear network coding and linear system theory, especially
with the theory of codes on graphs. A simple presentation of linear network coding scenario is
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of linear network coding.
shown in Figure 2.3. The vector assigned to an outgoing link from each node is the linear
combination of the corresponding vectors assigned to the incoming links. Let’s suppose that
there are two bits x1 and x2, where the source node aims to send them through the network to
the destination nodes D1 and D2. These two bits can be written as a vector [x1 x2]. Based
on this scenario, [x1 x2]× [1 0]T , which matches to x1, is sent through the channel between
the source and node 2. Furthermore, the node 4 receives [x1 x2]× [1 1]T , which allows him
to receive and forward x1 + x2 to node 5. Finally, at a destination node, the native bits x1
and x2 can be retrieved from the received vectors of each channel [36,37].
Afterwards, a RLNC approach presented by Ho et. al in [18], where an original message
is split into packets, called native packets, which are grouped into generations. Initially, the
source encodes its native packets and then it multicasts them. Subsequently the intermediate
nodes recode the incoming encoded packets by using independently and randomly coefficients
from a finite field. Finally, the destination node is able to decode the incoming encoded
packets when an efficient number of encoded packets of the same generation have been received.
Decoding is only allowed for packets that belong to the same generation.
Due to its simplicity and distributed nature, RLNC quickly became the basis for several
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network coding protocols such as Mobile ad hoc Networks (MANETs), peer-to-peer content
distribution networks [6,38], wireless networks [39], and sensor networks [40]. Based on the idea
proposed in [41], the main advantage of RLNC is increasing the robustness through exploitation
of path diversity. RLNC has been shown to be particularly beneficial for guaranteeing robust
communication over highly dynamic networks with minimal or even no control information,
in the presence of disruptions such as congestion, corruption, packet loss, and changes of
topology.
Several authors have evaluated the performance of network coding for content distribution
networks and also studied the potential impact of RLNC in content distribution networks [6,38].
The authors in [6] proposed a scheme for content distribution of large files which shows that
network coding not only improves the performance in terms of expected file download time,
but also improves the robustness of the system. Furthermore, based on [38], since each node
forwards a random linear combination independently of the information present at other nodes,
its operation is completely decentralized. Moreover, there is high probability of obtaining
a linearly independent packet in each time when each node collects a random combination
of packets from a randomly chosen node. Thus, the problem of redundant transmissions is
considerably reduced.
The comparison of the performance of network coding with traditional coding measures
in a distributed storage setting, where each storage location only has very limited storage
space for each file, is presented by Acedanski et. al in [42]. It is shown that RLNC performs
well without the need for a large amount of additional storage space required at a centralized
server. More precisely, the benefits of RLNC in wireless environments with limited resources,
either due to mobility or battery rarity, are studied in [40], which proposes an algorithm aimed
at reducing the overhead of probabilistic routing algorithms with applications in delay tolerant
networks. Other RLNC based schemes that increase reliability and robustness while reducing
the incurred overhead can be found in [43,44].
In addition, several research studies have shown that network coding is suitable for other
applications, such as multimedia streaming [45–47], and multimedia streaming over peer-to-
peer networks which can reduce the network traffic, help control the server load and improve
the playback quality [48–53].
Technically, the works done in the scope of secure network coding can be classified in two
sets of passive attack and active attack [54]. In passive attacks, the attacker aims to only
observe the content of data symbols that flow on the wiretapped channels. This means passive
attackers only threaten the data privacy. Therefore, the content of each packet remains intact
even though essentially the packet information has been disclosed to the attacker. Active
attacks try to disrupt the normal network operation and may also alter, corrupt, or delete the
data packets being exchanged over the network.
In [55], the authors provide a brief review on the security aspects of stateless and state-aware
network coding. The set of possible attacks is categorized into two types of active and passive
attacks and based on the type of network code and attack, different countermeasure solutions
are reviewed in this reference. Another review on the security aspects of linear network coding,
various attack scenarios, the existing solutions, and the future works is presented in [56].
2.2.2 Network Coding Protocols
According to the paper presented in [55], NC protocols can be categorized into the following
two main types of protocols: stateless and state-aware NC based protocols. This categorization
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is based on whether the NC protocol makes use or does not make use of the network state
information which includes information related to the state of the network such as network
topology, link cost, and node location.
2.2.2.1 Stateless NC Protocols
As mentioned earlier, stateless NC based protocols do not rely on network state information
to perform coding operations such as the mixing of data packets. In stateless NC, coding
operations can work properly even in the presence of dynamically changing topologies, such
as in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs). For instance, Random Linear Network Coding
(RLNC) [18] is a distributed stateless NC protocol in which a node without any network
state information can randomly and independently choose a set of coefficients to perform a
linear combination of two or more received data packets and then send the resulted packet to
its output links. Stateless NC protocols are more immune against different types of attacks
compared to the state-aware NC based protocols because of their independence of the network
state information [57]. However, due to this independence, these protocols not only need more
sophisticated coding operations, but also the network codes are required to be selected from
a sufficiently large field in order to guarantee that encoding and decoding operations can
perform correctly in the source and sink nodes. This results in increasing the data overhead
in the network.
2.2.2.2 State-aware NC Protocols
State-aware NC protocols require that each node obtains partial or full network state
information. A very famous state-aware NC based protocol is COPE which is presented in [58].
This protocol uses local information and network state information to achieve improvements
in terms of throughput and robustness. More specifically, COPE proposes an opportunistic
network coding in order to reduce the number of transmissions. In state-aware NC protocols,
the fact that each node has knowledge of network state information such as the other nodes’
location, network topology and link state, leads to security vulnerabilities.
2.2.3 Notation, Definitions, and Assumptions
2.2.3.1 Finite Fields
All encryption algorithms involve arithmetic operations on integers. There is a need to
work in arithmetic defined over a field, if one of the operations that is used in the algorithm is
division. For convenience and for implementation efficiency, we would also like to work with
integers that fit exactly into a given number of bits with no wasted bit patterns. That is, we
wish to work with integers in the range 0 through 2n − 1, which fit into an n-bit word [29]. A
field F , denoted by {F ,+,×}, is a set of elements with two binary operations, called addition
and multiplication, such that satisfy the basic laws of arithmetic. Furthermore, a finite field, is
a field with a finite number of elements. The characterization of finite fields shows that every
finite field is of prime-power order. Furthermore, finite fields with the same number of elements
are isomorphic and may therefore be identified. A finite field Fp (in this thesis, we denote
interchangeably as Fp and as GF (p)), where p = 2n is represented by the set {0, 1, ..., p− 1}.
By setting n = 1, p is a prime number and this set should be closed under integer addition
and multiplication modulo p. In encryption algorithms, we aim to provide a uniform mapping
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Figure 2.4: A general multicast network model.
to be cryptographically stronger. Thus, the finite fields of the form F2n are attractive for
cryptographic algorithms. The entries of all multicast transmissions (where intermediate nodes
linearly combine their incoming information symbols), vectors, and matrices considered in
this thesis belong to a large enough finite field Fp. For instance, F2 denotes the smallest finite
field which contains two elements: 0 and 1, and the addition and multiplication tables shown
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
+ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
Table 2.1: Addition in F2
× 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
Table 2.2: Multiplication in F2
2.2.3.2 Network Model
To study NC, we consider single-source multicast transmission on a network (see Figure
2.4), which is defined by a triple (G ,S ,R) consisting of the following components:
• Acyclic and Directed multi-graph G : We consider a pair of V ,E as a directed acyclic
graph where V represents the set of all nodes of G and E represents the set of all edges
of G .
• Source node S : In our network model, we have a source S that transmits packets in
multicast mode. The source is one of the nodes of V .
• Non-source node R: In our network model, we consider that the intermediate and
destination nodes are included in a set of nodes which is defined as: R = {∀x ∈ V −{S}}.
The two main approaches of NC are the XOR NC and RLNC. Two examples of these
approaches based on the butterfly topology [1] are illustrated in Figure 2.5.a and Figure 2.5.b,
respectively. Both of these examples include one source node (i.e., node 1), a few intermediate
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Figure 2.5: (a) XOR NC based on the butterfly topology and (b) RLNC based on the butterfly
topology.
nodes (i.e., node 2, 3, 4 and 5) and two destination nodes (i.e., node 6 and 7). The source
node wants to deliver the native packets x1 and x2 to both destination nodes through the
intermediate nodes. In case of the XOR NC approach, node 4 XORing the two received
packets (x1 and x2 ) from the two incoming nodes and sends the result of x1 ⊕ x2 to node
5. Then, node 5 retransmits result of x1 ⊕ x2 to the sink nodes. Finally, the two sink nodes
decode the received result of x1 ⊕ x2 and obtain x1 and x2 , as it is depicted in Figure 2.5.a.
On the other hand, in the RLNC approach, node 4 creates the linear combination of x1
and x2 . Then, the linear combination is transmitted to node 5, where the linear combination
is recoded by using independently and randomly coefficients from a finite field. Afterwards,
node 5 transmits the outcome to the sink nodes, where it is decoded and shown in Figure
2.5.b.
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Figure 2.6: Canonical network coding example: node S multicasts bits x1 and x2 to nodes D1
and D2, respectively. If node 4 did not perform a simple encoding operation on the incoming
bits x1 and x2, the max-flow min-cut capacity of 2 could not be achieved [1].
2.2.4 Benefits made by network coding
Recent research efforts have shown that wireless networks can benefit from network coding
technique in terms of throughput, energy consumption, delay, and robustness to packet
losses [1, 5, 34,59–74]. These benefit characteristics are discussed as follows:
• Throughput
The following illustrates the idea behind the improvement in throughput improvement
brought by network coding. This simple idea is illustrated in the canonical network
coding example (known as the butterfly network), shown in Figure 2.6. Consider a
simple setting, with a source node S, and two destinations D1 and D2. The source node
S needs to deliver two bits, x1 and x2 respectively, to both destination nodes, using
each network edge only once. Therefore, it sends bit x1 to node 2, and bit x2 to node 3,
and each of these relay nodes (i.e., node 2 and node 3) further broadcasts the received
bit. Consequently, destination D1 and destination D2 receive x1 and x2 respectively,
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while relay node 4 obtains both bits. Based on the Max-flow Min-cut Theorem, the
min-cut to each destination equals 2, and this cannot be achieved unless node 4 encodes
x1 and x2 simultaneously. In traditional store-and-forward approaches, node 4 decides
which of the two bits to forward. If for example it picks bit x1, and further relay 4
broadcasts x1 to both of the destinations, then D1 obtains only bit x1 (twice), and D2
obtains both of the source bits. With network coding, the nodes are allowed to perform
coding operations on the incoming data, thus node 4 forwards x1 + x2, which is then
broadcasted by 5 to both D1 and D2. Consequently, receiver D1 obtains x1 from node 2
and x1 + x2 from node 5, which enables it to decode bit x2 as well. Similarly, node D2
decodes both bits as well. Thus, by means of network coding, the source S can deliver
two bits simultaneously to both destinations.
The average throughput of network is anaylysed in [66], where a multicast model scenario
is applied on either linear network coding scheme or random linear network coding
scheme. The average throughput is the averaged rate that each sink node experiences.
Their results have shown that network coding offers benefit in average throughput
proportional to
√
n, where n is the number of sink nodes.
The gain in throughput efficiency made by network coding is not only constrained to
the case of multicast, but also applicable to other traffic configurations, such as unicast
transmissions [67]. As an example, COPE [39] is a technique that benefits from network
coding in terms of throughput in wireless networks when the traffic is transmitting in
unicast model. Furthermore, a theoretical analysis of the throughput gain in COPE-
based network coding is presented in [67]. It is shown that network coding opportunities
lead to higher end-to-end throughput when compared to no coding routing strategies.
• Energy efficiency
In [72], the minimum-energy multicast problem is studied by constructing network
codes, where constitute a fully decentralized approach. The authors in [73] adopted
the network coding approach to achieve minimum-cost multicast in both wireline and
wireless networks. In this work, they applied distributed routing algorithms to solve
the multicast subgraph optimization for fixed link capacities. They have shown that
this has to be achieved through either deterministically or opportunistically scheduling
transmitters’ access to the wireless medium.
Wu et. al proposed an alternative method for minimum-energy multicast in mobile
ad hoc networks [75]. It is shown that the minimum energy multicast energy-per-bit
can be obtained by performing network coding, but not traditional routing. A network
coding scheme, called hybrid automatic repeat request with incremental redundancy
(HARQ-IR) scheme, provides the energy efficiency of a two-way relaying system [76].
The proposed network coding scheme calculates the average energy consumption for
signal transmission over block fading channel and concludes that network coding brings
benefit in terms of energy efficiency to the two-way relaying networks.
The work in [58] introduces a distributed protocol which supports multiple unicast
flows efficiently by exploiting the shared nature of the wireless medium. Platz et. al
apply linear network coding and random linear network coding schemes on ad-hoc
networks [69]. The simulation results show that there are significant improvements
in energy efficiency for these coded networks compared to the networks applying the
traditional store-and-forward approach.
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Since it is assumed that each transmission consumes the same amount of energy, the
total energy is proportional to the number of transmissions. In this regards, the proposed
scheme in [77] aims to minimize the number of transmissions. The energy efficiency
under these assumptions are evaluated, showing that network coding can improve energy
efficiency by a constant factor in fixed networks, and by a factor of log n in dynamically
changed networks, where n is the number of nodes in the network [77].
• Delay
Network coding-enabled wireless networks may suffer from the delay which is caused
from the encoding and decoding procedures [45–47,78,79]. It is shown that there is a
trade-off between throughput efficiency and decoding delay [63]. More precisely, the
more packets need to be encoded, recoded, and decoded to have a system with high
throughput, which makes result in larger delay.
The proposed model in [80] claimed that network coding can be used to reduce the delay
in large files transmissions networks. They have shown that random linear network
coding not only brings arbitrary gain in delay by scaling the system parameters, but
also has the minimum delay compared to other non-coding schemes.
In [74], firstly the relation between the average delay and the size of coding buffer is
examined. Then, it is shown that network coding schemes enable a network to achieve
the lower bound of the expected delay. Moreover, the upper and lower bounds of delay
in multicast model is derived in [81]. The proposed scheme is based on an adaptive
model which enables all destinations to find the maximum number of packets that can
be encoded.
The design of some real-time applications is considered in [82], where delay probability
is investigated. In this regards, the two analyze models, Markov chain and brute-force,
are considered, where a multicast model is used to apply RLNC over erasure channel.
In the Markov chain analyze, their results show that even by choosing GF (2), which is
convenient for its low computational complexity, it bears the cost of a heavy tail in the
delay distribution. However, in the brute-force analyze, the main idea is to select a large
number of fixed erasure patterns and measure for every erasure pattern the delay of all
possible encodings or sets of linear combinations of packet symbols. They have shown
that their proposed model is feasible for small field size and small generation size, which
yielding a characterization of the delay distribution under RLNC scenarios.
In other work proposed in [78], the authors aim to examine the exact probability of
decoding N linear independent packets among T received packets at a sink node. Their
study shows that the number of received packet is proportional to the delay.
• Reliability
Previous works in network coding fields show that it is able to bring a more reliability in
a network [83–92]. More precisely, in non-coded wireless network, several retransmissions
(i.e., if a transmission fails due to the lost or dropped) of the native data packet from the
source node are needed to retrieve it. Network coding is combined with retransmission
techniques to improve the reliability of packets transmissions to multiple receivers [93–95].
A proposed XOR-based coding scheme in [96] aims to combine the lost packets of different
sink nodes. Their results show that the schemes who are using a dynamic network coding
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benefit the smallest number of retransmissions. In this work, under different scenarios,
the expected number of retransmissions for a packet to reach every sink node successfully
is examined. Furthermore, the XOR-based network coding scheme, presented in [90], is
applied to lossy networks to reduce the number of retransmissions. The main idea relies
on encoding the lost packets of different nodes (sinks) and broadcasting the coded packet
to all of them. They have shown that by using this idea and instead of transmitting
individual lost packet separately, the total number of retransmissions can be reduced.
Moreover, multiple sink nodes have the possibility to retrieve their lost packets in one
transmission.
Fang et. al aim to find the optimal coding set of the lost packets so that the number
of retransmissions is minimized [86]. This coding set is generated by a colouring-based
heuristic algorithm. In this scheme, a packet-loss table, which contains the packet loss
information of every sink nodes, is used to encode the lost packets.
Reference [97] proposed the network coding aided Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ).
More specifically, a source node first finds the sink nodes who received the packets
unsuccessfully, then, it employs network coding to broadcast a selected combination of
those packets to the sink nodes. Due to the possibility of overhearing of all the packets,
the number of retransmissions can be reduced. Furthermore, the reliability gain is
characterized analytically in [87,98], where network coding is applied and compared with
traditional error control protocols, such as ARQ and Forward Error Correction (FEC).
More precisely, the authors, in the first proposed work [87], calculate the expected
numbers of retransmissions by the source node under different error control protocols.
Their numerical results show that the reliability gain made by network coding increases
logarithmically. The authors prove this hypothesis in their latter work [98].
Improving the reliability by using opportunistic routing in wireless mesh networks when
channel quality is poor is studied in [5, 99]. In MORE [5], a node creates a random
linear combination of the packets, and does not decode the packets until they reach the
destination. Consequently, the probability of successfully receiving and decoding packets
at the sink nodes is raised and the reliability is improved as well.
2.2.5 The challenges in Network Coding
In this section, some challenges existing in the design of network coding schemes are
summarized in two parts as follows:
• XOR Network Coding It is shown that XOR-based network coding schemes can
benefit from low computational complexity, where encoding and decoding require only
XOR operations. However, take into consideration that, an improper design of XOR
coding may not only provide poor throughput, delay, energy efficiency, and reliability,
but also bring negative effect to a network. This happens because of the lack of native
packets in the sink nodes. For example, the coded packet X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X4 is not a good
coded packet to retrieve the native packets X1, X2, X3 and X4 which are transmitted by
a source node to a destination node who has obtained only X1, X2. Thus, a network
may suffer from decoding delay in order to collect a native packet (i.e., X3, X4). In
addition, the number of native packets to be encoded affects the encoding and decoding
delay because sufficient packets are required to be obtained before coding can proceed.
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• Random Linear Network Coding
Based on the fact that real channels have errors and changing topology in the network,
random linear network coding schemes are basically used for theoretical analysis [37].
However, there are several parameters which should be chosen carefully in real scenario
of RLNC. The number of packets to be encoded is one of the important parameters.
Several works have shown that this parameter can affect both throughput and delay
of the network [39, 45, 47, 67]. Moreover, in RLNC schemes, we have to take into
consideration that, other important parameter which can affect the overhead and also
decoding probability is the size of finite field. It is shown that the larger finite fields
enable the sink nodes to decode the more independent coded packets. However, it should
be mentioned clearly, that increasing the finite field size brings more overhead.
Our summary and comparison of the existing challenges in network coding schemes is
presented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Comparison of existing challenges in NC
NC Model Complexity Reliability Practical Simulation [100]
XOR NC low low easy easy
RLNC high high hard hard
2.2.6 The principle of RLNC
Random Linear Network Coding is a distributed methodology for performing network
coding, in which the source generates a linear combination of its original packets using random
coefficients from a finite field. Furthermore, intermediate nodes perform this random linear
combination using the coded packets previously received and those stored in the node’s buffer
with random coefficients. Each coded packet is sent along with the global encoding vector,
which is the set of linear transformations that the original packet goes through on its path
from the source to the destination. After transmission, when a destination node has obtained
enough linearly independent coded packets, it can decode and recover the original packets by
using Gaussian eliminations [18]. The operations of RLNC are summarized in Algorithm 1.
The key characteristic of RLNC is that coefficients are selected randomly over a finite
field. This implies the transmission of coding vectors to the receivers by appending them as
an overhead to the header of the data packets. Based on h and p, which are the number of
information flows at the source node and the size of the finite field respectively, this overhead
is calculated as h log p [101].
2.2.7 A General Model of RLNC
In our assumption, we consider three phases which are run by a source node, intermediate
nodes, and destination nodes. First, a source node encodes the native data packets and
transmits them into the network; next, an intermediate node recodes the incoming encoded
packets and forwards them toward a destination node, and finally, the destination node decodes
the incoming coded packets to retrieve the native data packets. Any packet and generation
should follow the same three phases as illustrated in Figure 2.7. To continue this section, we
consider that the source node sends g native data packets, where each of them is shown by
size w, into the network. These three phases are described in details as follows:
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Algorithm 1: Random Linear Network Coding Operations
main()
Initialization and encoding (at source node S):
The source S partitions each message into a number of packets (i.e., u1, ..., un) for each generation. Then, it
starts encoding the packets.
Recoding (at intermediate node V ):
if Generation number of the received packet is same then
Gaussian elimination is performed ;
if the packet is non-innovative then
it is discarded;
else
it is put into the buffer of node V sorted by generation number
when there is a transmission opportunity, the node chooses all the packets that are in the buffer to make a
random linear combination of them:
y =
h∑
i=1
ciui
where each ci ∈ Fp is a random coefficient chosen by each intermediate node.
Decoding (at sink node D):
if Generation number of the received packet is same then
if Gaussian elimination is performed correctly then
The sink node is able to retrieve the packets u1, ..., un;
else
a decoding error occurs.
• Source node:
First, the source node aims to generate g native data packets, where each of them can
be defined as a vector xi = [x
1
i , x
2
i , ..., x
w
i ]. X denotes the matrix of native data packet
and is written as follows:
X =
x
1
1 ... x
w
1
...
x1g ... x
w
g

g∗w
(2.1)
where each element of matrix X stands in a finite field Fp. Then, the source node chooses
a random matrix of coefficients C as follows:
C =
c
1
1 ... c
g
1
...
c1g ... c
g
g

g∗g
(2.2)
An encoded data packet is denoted as following:
M = C×X =
m
1
1 ... m
w
1
...
m1g ... m
w
g

g∗w
(2.3)
Before transmitting, the source node concatenates the matrix M with the matrix
of coefficients C, which is called encoded matrix. The encoded matrix B, which is
represented in Equation 2.4, is sent to the intermediate nodes.
B = [ C |X ] =
β
1
1 ... β
w+g
1
...
β1g ... β
w+g
g

g∗(w+g)
(2.4)
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Figure 2.7: Three general phases in RLNC.
We also note that, each row of encoded matrix (e.g., Bi = [β
1
i ...β
g+w
i ]) is called a
codeword. To decode the native data packet, the destination node should receive at least
g linear independent codewords.
• Intermediate node:
Recoding operations, at the intermediate node, is started since it receives all g codewords
from the source node. Then, the intermediate node makes a random matrix to generate
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a coefficients matrix D as following:
D =
d
1
1 ... d
g
1
...
d1g ... d
g
g

g∗g
(2.5)
In the next step, recoding is done to make a new encoded packet as:
M
′
= D × B =

m
′1
1 ... m
′w+g
1
...
m
′1
g ... m
′w+g
g

g∗(w+g)
(2.6)
Finally, the new coded packet M
′
is sent to the destination node. As mentioned in [102],
several different policies for the recoding operations can be applied. Based on the policy
which each intermediate node chooses, it starts buffering the input coming codewords.
For instance, it may start the recoding process in each time interval or by having at
least a number of codewords in its input buffer. Furthermore, the intermediate node
may receive the codewords from different paths. Also, the intermediate node may mix
codewords from different flows of data (called inter-flow or inter-session network coding),
or it can recode and mix only the codewords of the same flow (called intra-flow or
intra-session network coding) [103,104].
• Destination node:
The sink node should keep checking the rank of the total received codewords belonging
to the same generation. It can immediately start the decoding when the sink node
receives enough linear independent codewords (i.e., the rank of the received codewords,
which is called innovative codewords, reaches to g). Take into consideration that each
received codeword has two parts (i.e., header, which includes the coefficients, and trailer,
which includes the codewords), the destination node forms the codewords and coefficients
matrices by the following matrices:
T =
t
1
1 ... t
w
1
...
t1g ... t
w
g

g∗w
(2.7)
H =
h
1
1 ... h
g
1
...
h1g ... h
g
g

g∗g
(2.8)
Based on linear combinations which the matrix T is created, the destination node needs
to find the solutions, via Gaussian elimination method, for the following equation:
X = H−1 × T (2.9)
Now, we give an example for RLNC approach to show the RLNC process in details, as follows.
Note that all the arithmetic operations such as addition, multiplication, addition inverse and
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multiplicative inverse are defined and executed over the field F23 . Before giving the example
and for simplicity, the mathematic in F23 is illustrated in following Tables:
Table 2.4: Addition in F23
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0 3 2 5 4 7 6
2 2 3 0 1 6 7 4 5
3 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4
4 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3
5 5 4 7 6 1 0 3 2
6 6 7 4 5 2 3 0 1
7 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table 2.5: Multiplication in F23
× 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 2 4 6 3 1 7 5
3 0 3 6 5 7 4 1 2
4 0 4 3 7 6 2 5 1
5 0 5 1 4 2 7 3 6
6 0 6 7 1 5 3 2 4
7 0 7 5 2 1 6 4 3
Table 2.6: Addition and multiplication inverse in F23
w −w w−1
0 0 1
1 0 1
2 0 1
3 0 1
4 0 1
5 0 1
6 0 1
7 0 1
To continue, we assume that the source node aims to send three native data packets
x1 = 7, x2 = 2, and x3 = 1. The source node generates the native data matrix as follows:
X =
7 ← x12 ← x2
1 ← x3

3∗1
(2.10)
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Then, the coefficients are generated as follows:1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

3∗3
(2.11)
The concatenation of theses matrices is shown as follows:1 0 0 | 70 1 0 | 2
0 0 1 | 1
 (2.12)
By using a random coefficients matrix, a new coded packets matrix is generated by the source
node as follows: 1 1 1 | 4← x1 + x2 + x32 0 1 | 4← 2 ∗ x1 + x3
2 1 0 | 7← 2 ∗ x1 + x2
 (2.13)
We call each row of coded matrix x′1, x′2, and x′3, respectively.x′1 = 4← x1 + x2 + x3x′2 = 4← 2 ∗ x1 + x3
x′3 = 7← 2 ∗ x1 + x2
 (2.14)
Since an intermediate node receives this matrix, starts recoding as follows:5 3 1 | 1← x′1 + 2 ∗ x′30 1 1 | 3← x′2 + x′3
0 2 3 | 7← 2 ∗ x′1 + x′2
 (2.15)
The received coded packet can retrieve the native data packet via Gaussian elimination:5 3 1 | 10 1 1 | 3
0 0 1 | 1
 (2.16)
which leads to retrieve the native packet as:5 3 1 | 10 1 1 | 3
0 0 1 | 1← x3 = 1

5 3 1 | 10 1 1 | 3← x2 = 2
0 0 1 | 1← x3 = 1

5 3 1 | 1← x1 = 70 1 1 | 3← x2 = 2
0 0 1 | 1← x3 = 1
 (2.17)
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2.2.8 Analysis of RLNC
Apart of corruption or lossy channel, there are two main reasons such as (i) Insufficient
rank and (ii) Insufficient receiving codewords, in which the sink node may fail to fully retrieve
the native packets. These cases affect the error decoding probability [102], throughput, delay,
redundancy, coefficients overhead, and the time required to recover the native data packets.
Moreover, the capability of a receiver to successfully decode the native data packets depends
on the number of sinks and the size of finite field. This also introduces a trade-off between
the decoding error probability and the complexity of the coding operations over the finite
field. To continue, we present the simulation results related to the performance of the RLNC
mechanism in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we aim to find out the error
decoding probability of the general model presented in Figure 2.7, where the effect of different
number of packets and finite field size are studied. In the second scenario, we aim to discover
the time required to recover successfully the native data packets, where the effect of different
number of packets and finite field size are considered in this scenario too.
1. Error decoding probability
Based on the network model of RLNC described in Section 2.2.7, the lower bound on
the probability that the RLNC scheme supports the multicast flow is given by following
Theorem [18]:
Theorem 1. [18] Consider a multicast connection problem on an arbitrary network
with a source, and a network code in which some or all network code coefficients are
chosen uniformly at random from a finite field Fp where p>d (d is the number of sink
nodes), and the remaining code coefficients, if any, are fixed. If there exists a solution
to the network connection problem with the same values for the fixed code coefficients,
then the probability that the random network code is valid for the problem is at least
(1− d/p)η, where η is the number of links associated with random coefficients.
In case of an acyclic network, following the Theorem 1 in [18], the lower bound on the
error decoding probability, is calculated as following:
pe = 1− ps = 1− (1− d/p)|E| (2.18)
Where d is the number of sink nodes, |E| corresponds to the number of edges, and p is
the finite field size.
We have considered the several parameters which can affect the network performance as
follows:
• Number of receivers:
We illustrate this probability for different number of sink nodes in Figure 2.8. As it
is shown in this figure, by increasing the number of receivers in the network, the
error probability increases. Moreover, increasing the number of edges also affect
the error decoding probability.
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Figure 2.8: Error decoding probability for different number of destination nodes.
• Finite field size:
The other representation of this probability is shown in Figure 2.9, where we show
the effect of the error decoding probability based on different finite field size. Our
simulation results show that, RLNC schemes which use a small finite field size (i.e.,
F23), has a larger error decoding probability in compared to the RLNC schemes
who use a larger finite field size (i.e., F27 and F28).
• Number of native packets:
In other simulation illustration, we show the direct effectiveness of the error decoding
probability and the number of native packets. In this regard, in MATLAB, we
generate 10 times, which is called sample id, several random numbers (i.e., native
data packets) from different finite field size. In Figures 2.10, it is shown that by
increasing the number of data native packets, a RLNC scheme can decode the
coded packets with a lower probability, where different finite field size such as F2,
F27 , and F28 are applied respectively.
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Figure 2.9: Error decoding probability for different finite fields.
Based on Figure 2.10, the successful decoding probability is very low in case of
finite field F2. This is obvious which is related to the number innovative packets
arrive at the sink nodes.
A much better successful decoding probability is shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12.
Based on these Figures, the successful decoding probability is almost same in the
different finite fields (F27 and F28)
As a result, it is shown that successful decoding probability has a direct relation
with the number of packets per each generation in RLNC schemes. It seems, a
finite field such as F27 or F28 has a better successful decoding probability compared
to F2. More precisely, by increasing the number of data packets, the finite field
size should be large enough to enable a sink node to retrieve the packets successfully.
• Finite field size:
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Figure 2.10: Successful decoding probability for different number of packets when the finite
field size is F2.
In this section, we demonstrate three Figures 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 which show the
successful decoding probability of the RLNC mechanism versus the finite filed size.
Increasing p, the finite field size, leads to a higher complexity for encoding, recoding
and decoding; however, the number of packets can also increase the decoding
probability. More precisely, we consider three scenarios which different number
of packets (i.e., 2, 4, and 8) are used in each of them. We aim to calculate the
successful decoding probability with different number of finite fields. In the first
scenario, we assume that the source node generates only 2 packets over three
different number of finite fields (see Figure 2.13).
In the second and third scenarios, we consider that the source node wants to transfer
4 and 8 packets, respectively. As mentioned earlier, the number of packets can
alter the performance of a RLNC scheme; however, in the last simulation results
it is shown that the finite field size can also affect the performance of the RLNC
scheme. In other words, it should be mentioned that the number of native packets
in each generation and also a finite field size, which are chosen by the source node,
are two important factors which can lead to an increase in the RLNC performance.
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Figure 2.11: Successful decoding probability for different number of packets when the finite
field size is F27 .
More precisely, our simulation results show that the finite fields F27 , and F28 can
be used as practice, based on fact that they represent a better successful decoding
probability (see Figures 2.14 and 2.15).
2. Time complexity
To obtain a time required for decoding the data packets, we run our simulations on a
3.16GHz Intel Core 2 CPU, and 4 GB of RAM. In this thesis, a total time requirement
is known as the whole time which is required from generating a packet by a source node,
recoded by an intermediate node, and until finally decoded by a sink node. However, we
also calculate three required times, which are used in our simulation in this thesis, such
as encoded time, recoded time, and encoded time. The encoded time is considered as
the required time for the source node to generate the data packets and encode them.
A recoded time is considered as the time that an intermediate node needs to recode
the data packets. Furthermore, a decoded time is used by the sink nodes to decoded
the native data packets. For that reason, our simulation consists of two parts: (i) total
time requirement and (ii) encoded, recoded, and decoding time requirement, where the
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Figure 2.12: Successful decoding probability for different number of packets when the finite
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Figure 2.13: Successful decoding probability for different finite fields when the number of
packets is 2.
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Figure 2.14: Successful decoding probability for different finite fields when the number of
packets is 4.
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Figure 2.15: Successful decoding probability for different finite fields when the number of
packets is 8.
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following parameters are simulated respectively as follows:
(a) Total time requirement:
• Finite field size:
In Figure 2.16, we illustrate the total time requirement where our simulation
is run over a finite field F27 . We also demonstrate time decoding requirement
over a finite field F28 in Figure 2.17.
Based on these Figures, it is completely clear that increasing the number of
packets increases the time complexity.
• Number of native packets:
In the following, we show the effect of the number of packets on the total time
requirement. In this regard, Figures 2.18, 2.19, and 2.20 illustrate the time
complexity when we run our simulation over three number of packets, 2, 4, and
8, respectively.
(b) encoded, recoded, and decoding time requirement:
• Finite field size:
The encoded time, recoded time, and decoded time are illustrated in Figures
2.21, 2.22, and 2.23 respectively. In these simulations, we set the number of
packets 4, and we show the results of different number of finite fields on each
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Figure 2.16: Required total time for different number of packets over F27 .
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Figure 2.17: Required total time for different number of packets over F28 .
encoded, recoded, and decoded time requirement.
• Number of native packets:
To end this section, we show the effect of the number of packets on encoded,
recoded, and decoded time requirement. In this regard, Figures 2.24, 2.25,
and 2.26 illustrate the time complexity when we run our simulation over three
number of packets, 2, 4, and 8, respectively.
From the complexity analysis of the RLNC scheme above, we come to the conclusion that
it is necessary to know the number of packets and finite field size which are the two most
important parameters that a source node should use to transmit its native data. In order
to do that, based on the several practical network coding applications [36, 100], it seems
that a RLNC scheme which uses a finite field F27 or F28 can benefit from advantages of
network coding.
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Figure 2.19: Required total time for 4 packets.
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Figure 2.20: Required total time for 8 packets.
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Figure 2.21: Required encoding time for 4 packets.
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Figure 2.23: Required decoding time for 4 packets.
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2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we gave an overview of the main principle of cryptography and network
coding. We also introduced the related works and existing schemes in the field of network
coding. Then, we discuss the notation and assumption which we use in this thesis. The benefits
and drawbacks of network coding were also discussed. Finally, we simulated the performance
of a simple RLNC system. Our results have shown, that choosing parameters such as the
number of packets in each generation and finite field size can influence many properties of the
constructed RLNC, including but not limited to: throughput, delay, coefficients overhead, and
decoding error probability.
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Chapter 3
Secure Network Coding
“In all secrets there is a kind of guilt,
however beautiful or joyful they may be,
or for what good end they may be set to
serve. Secrecy means evasion, and
evasion means a problem to the moral
mind.”
Gilbert Parker
The Network Coding (NC) technique in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), Wireless
Networks (WNs), Smart Grid (SG), Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) and Mobile ad hoc
Networks (MANETs) can be a promising solution since it can provide significant benefits
including improved network capacity and robustness. However, the Network Coding-enabled
WNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks that can compromise the security of the network.
Based on that and the fact that the security is critical factor for the success of wireless
communications, we steer our focus on the mitigation of these types of attacks. In particular,
we intend to provide a framework towards the deployment of the appropriate countermeasures
against attacks targeting Network Coding-enabled WNs.
3.1 Introduction
We depend on Internet not only for our most business but also entertainments through
WNs and it is proved that WNs provide us with infinite information about everything. So
using WNs to access to the Internet and World Wide Web (WWW) have become a part of our
daily life to find people, news, weather, sports, recipes. However, having a secure framework
and assuring secure connection between devices and the Internet, or between devices become
vital important. According to the basic concept of wireless networks and their behaviors,
there are lots of security requirements and goals that should be considered in this kind of
networks. Actually, the broadcast nature of wireless channel gives additional challenges for
secure connection, because it is difficult to contain where that signal may travel. To address
these challenges, the application of Network Coding technology in WNs can be a promising
solution since it can provide significant benefits including improved network capacity and
robustness among others. However, the Network Coding-enabled WNs are vulnerable to
various types of attacks that can compromise the security of the networks that integrate them.
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Based on that and the fact that the security is critical factor in wireless networks, our main
contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• We review the security goals that we should consider in a wireless communications, and
then we will introduce some of the most common threats and attacks that occur in a
wireless network.
• We intent to provide a foundation for organizing research efforts towards the deployment
of the appropriate countermeasures against attacks targeting Network Coding-enabled
WNs.
Following the introduction, this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, a compre-
hensive review of the security requirements for NC-enabled WNs is provided. In Section 3.3,
the main categories of attacks against NC-enabled WNs that can affect the security of the
whole network are presented. In Section 3.4, countermeasures for attacks included into the
defined categories in Section 3.3 are discussed. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Security Requirements for Network Coding-Enabled Wire-
less Networks
NC-enabled WNs can be the target of many known and unknown security threats since
many security breaches can raise in its environment due to its heterogeneous and dynamic
nature. Hence, the following security properties are required to be assured in NC-enabled
WNs: Authentication, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Availability and Non-repudiation
[105,106].
• Authentication: Ensures that the origin of a packet delivered over a wireless com-
munication channel is traceable. Thus, a receiving node is able to verify that the
received message have indeed come from the legitimate sender node and not from a
malicious actor. Furthermore, authentication guarantees that two nodes entering into a
communication authenticate each other. In other words, authentication ensures that
each communicating node is the one that it claims to be [29,105,107].
• Data Confidentiality: Prevents an unauthorized entity from accessing a message
shared between entities authorized to access it. For example, this property allows only
the legitimate nodes to access the content of the transmitted messages between them.
Moreover, sensitive information located on the nodes such as private keys and identities
must be protected from unauthorized access [105,107].
• Data Integrity: Data integrity methods attempt at preventing modification of com-
municated/stored data by an unauthorized entity. Integrity is compromised when a
malicious actor accidentally or purposely modifies or deletes data [105,107].
• Availability: Ensures that any resource of a given NC-enabled WN is always available
for any legitimate entity. Availability guarantees that the provided services of the NC-
enabled WN are always available even in presence of internal or external attacks [105,107].
• Non-repudiation: Prevents an entity from denying previous activities. For example,
after completing the process of sending and receiving data, neither the sender later can
deny that he sent the information nor the receiver can deny the reception [108].
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3.3 Security Attacks for Network Coding-Enabled WNs
Taking into consideration the broadcast nature of the wireless channel and the security
vulnerabilities of the NC technique, the satisfaction of the above-mentioned security require-
ments in NC-enabled WNs is a challenging task. A known classification of security attacks,
which is defined both in X.800 and RFC 2828, includes passive attacks and active attacks [54].
Passive attacks only observe the communication without interfering in any way; in the
other words they do not disturb the normal operation of the network. Malicious nodes that
perform a passive attack only snoop (or read) the exchanged information without modifying
it. As they do not compromise the operation of the network, detection of this type of attacks
is difficult. On the other side, active attacks try to disrupt the normal network operation
and may also alter, corrupt, or delete the data packets being exchanged over the network.
Furthermore, the most active attackers can threaten different network layers (i.e., MAC layer,
network layer, transport layer and application layer). Attacks targeting the NC-enabled WNs
in different network layers are presented in Figure 3.1.
Some of the most destructive network attacks such as pollution attacks, Byzantine fabri-
cation and modification attacks are caused by active attackers inside the network. Despite
its benefits, NC-enabled networks are more susceptible to attacks than traditional store-and-
forward one, since even a single number of corrupted packets can infect a large number of
downstream nodes because the corrupted packets propagate via recoding. We consider two
types of attackers; internal and external attackers. As internal attackers, we consider the nodes
that have been compromised or the legitimate nodes that have been turned into malicious ones.
Moreover, they have access to network resources and key material. However, the external
attackers are limited to adversaries without having access to network resources; this includes
eavesdropping, modification and replay of packets. However, our main purpose in this chapter
is to study the common attacks which are possible for NC-enabled WNs. Specifically, our
main idea here is to show how the specific characteristics of NC can be exploited by attackers.
3.3.1 Eavesdropping
The main goal of an eavesdropper is to read data traffic and obtain sensitive information
(e.g., native packets, public keys, private keys, location, or passwords of other nodes). In
this case, the attacker not only acts as a normal node but also tries to attain some sensitive
information that should be kept secret during the communication (see Figure 3.2). In order to
obtain this information, the eavesdropper node only listens to the message transmission in the
broadcasting wireless medium [109]. Eavesdropper targets at degrading the confidentiality of
the transmitted data.
3.3.2 Impersonation
This attack is a kind of active eavesdropping, where the attacker nodes in order to obtain
the information send queries to the victim nodes by concealing themselves as friendly nodes.
By this bogus authenticity, the attacker can introduce conflicting routes or routing loops, cause
waste of nodes’ power and portion the network (see Figure 3.3). State-aware NC protocols
rely on network nodes which can be effected by this type of attack [55]. Impersonation targets
to degrade the authenticity property in NC-enabled WNs.
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Figure 3.1: Attacks against NC-enabled WNs on different network layers. At the right side,
we show the specific attacks for each layer, and at the left side, we show the common attacks
targeting all the network layers.
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Figure 3.2: A simple eavesdropping attack behavior, where he tries to listen to the data which
are available at the channel.
N1 N2
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Figure 3.3: A simple impersonation attack behavior.
3.3.3 Byzantine Attacks
A Byzantine attack is an attempt to make the resources of a system unavailable to the
legitimate users. More specifically, an adversary aims to prevent some services from functioning
efficiently. Hardware failures, software bugs or resource exhaustion can lead to Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Actually, the adversary in DoS attacks targets availability, which
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ensures that an authorize node can access all the services of the network. In this attack, the
malicious node may inject a high volume of junk packets into the network and this leads
to waste of network resources like nodes’ battery power, memory, and wired or wireless
channels. Various types of Byzantine attacks work at different layers and affect differently
the network such as jamming and tampering at the physical layer, collision and exhaustion
at the link layer, black holes and routing table overflow at the network layer, SYN flooding
and de-synchronization at the transport layer, and finally failure in the web servers at the
application layer [110].
Byzantine attacks include a wide range of attacks such as selectively dropping packets,
forwarding data packets through non-optimal or even invalid routes, generating routing loops,
modifying or altering the message in transit, changing the header of packets, flooding its
neighbors via injecting lots of corrupted blocks (pollution attack) or even clean but old and
reparative packets (Byzantine replay attack) into the downstream victim nodes, and so on.
The main objective of these attacks is to decrease the network throughput. In state-aware NC
protocols, packet headers normally contain topology states and routing information, and in
stateless NC protocols, headers normally contain the required decoding vectors [22]. Therefore,
the Byzantine attacks are not only disruptive on state-aware NC protocols but also impose
a negative impact on stateless NC. In NC-enabled WNs, the main categories of Byzantine
attacks that may occur are the following:
3.3.3.1 Byzantine Fabrication (Pollution Attack)
Based on the nature of packet mixing in NC schemes, these schemes are vulnerable to
a severe security threat known also as pollution attacks, where an adversary node injects
corrupted packets into the network. So, by propagating a corrupted packet that an intermediate
node uses during the coding process, all the packets that are coded and forwarded by the node
will be corrupted as well. Moreover, Byzantine fabrication attacks can disrupt the routing
operation of network in different ways such as forwarding data packets through non-optimal or
even invalid routes and generating routing loops. In state-aware NC protocols, packet headers
normally contain topology states and routing information. Also, in stateless NC protocols,
headers normally contain required decoding vectors. Therefore, the Byzantine fabrication
attacks are disruptive for both stateless and state-aware NC protocols. We present a pollution
attack in Figure 3.4. Pollution attack targets to compromise the data integrity property in
NC-enabled WNs.
3.3.3.2 Byzantine Modification
In this type of attack, the adversary aims at modification of the transmitted data in transit.
For instance, the attacker can send a lot of unnecessary messages to a victim node by changing
the destination node native messages. More precisely, the adversary causes a destination node
decodes the native packets incorrectly by changing the coded packets in transit in stateless
NC protocols. State-aware NC protocols can be affected by changes on either the coded data
packets [55].
3.3.3.3 Byzantine Replay Attack
A node sends the old authenticated previously transmitted messages to the network.
Sending these old messages cause waste network resources, and eventually degrade the overall
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Figure 3.4: A Simple Byzantine Fabrication Attack.
throughput rate [111]. Stateless NC protocols can be affected in terms of NC gain and
processing time by the injection of packets which are repeated into the information flow.
State-aware NC protocols can be affected by sending the old messages to the specific victims in
order to waste its resource as well. An example of a Byzantine replay attack is demonstrated
in Figure 3.5.
3.3.4 Wormhole
Wormholes can constitute a serious threat in WNs, where two or more malicious nodes can
collaborate and create a tunnel between two nodes. Afterwards, these malicious nodes record
packets and retransmit them into the network through the tunnel [112]. The adversaries target
at convincing the neighbor nodes that the two side of tunnel are in the same range and very
close to each other. By using this strategy, an adversary may be able to send the messages to
the other part of the tunnel in the network without being in the same range. The wormhole
attack can impose more severe impact on the state-aware NC protocols, such as disrupting the
route discovery process and taking the control of flows by leading them through the tunnel,
in comparison with the impact on the stateless protocols. Figure 3.6 depicts the wormhole
attack.
3.3.5 Entropy Attack
An adversary intends to generate valid but non-innovative packets that are valid linear
combination which are stored or overheard at an earlier time by the adversary. In other
words, the adversary node creates and distributes a non-innovative coded packet which is
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Figure 3.5: Byzantine Replay attack.
a non-random linear combination of coded packets such that the generated coded packet is
linearly dependent with the previous coded packets stored at a downstream node. These valid
but non-innovative packets decrease the decoding opportunities at sinks in both stateless and
state-aware NC systems, cause waste of network resources, and degrade the overall throughput
rate. In a pollution attack, a node creates and generates a coded packet which is not valid
linear combinations of the native data. However, entropy attackers create and distribute coded
packets that are valid linear combinations of the native data. As a result, a pollution defense
is not helpful against an entropy attack because all of the defenses against pollution attacks
rely on the fact that an invalid coded packet is not a valid linear combination [111].
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Figure 3.6: Wormhole attack.
3.4 Security Countermeasures for Network Coding-Enabled
Wireless Networks
The fact that NC allows intermediate nodes to manipulate and mix incoming data packets
from neighbor nodes as well as transmits data packets to neighbor nodes leads to open security
issues in NC-enabled WNs. Therefore, the NC-enabled WNs are vulnerable to various types of
attacks that can compromise the security of WNs. These types of attacks, which are presented
in Section 3.3, are summarized into Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Attacks against NC-enabled WNs
Type of Attack State-aware/Stateless NC Target
Eavesdropping Both Confidentiality
Impersonation State-aware NC Authenticity
Byzantine Both Integrity, Availability
Wormhole Both Confidentiality
Entropy Both Integrity
In this section, we particularly focus on the mitigation of eavesdropping, entropy, and
Byzantine fabrication (pollution) attacks, which are among the most common attacks that
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Table 3.2: Categories of the security schemes against Pollution, eavesdropping, and entropy
attacks.
Type of Attack Security Schemes Related works
Byzantine Fabrication
Cryptography and
Key Management
Homomorphic hash functions [20,113]
Homomorphic digital signatures [23,24,114]
Homomorphic MAC [25,26,115]
Network Codes [116–118]
Cooperative Schemes [20,119–123]
Eavesdropping
Cryptography and Key Management [124,125]
Network Codes [14,17]
Cooperative Schemes [55]
Entropy
Only a limited number of defense mechanisms -
No any specific security scheme
[111,126]
can be used against NC-enabled WNs and have a negative impact on the security of the
whole networks. These attacks can result in the degradation of the performance gain of
coded networks or even worse in the complete disruption of the whole network operation.
However, these attacks have to be addressed in order for the NC-enabled WNs to reach their
full potential [70]. Towards this direction, several security schemes, focused on NC-enabled
WNs, have been recently proposed to handle these attacks since the traditional security
mechanisms are infeasible solutions for the resource constrained NC-enabled WNs due to the
large bandwidth for communication that they require. We classify the security schemes against
Byzantine fabrication, eavesdropping, and entropy attacks into three main categories as follows:
(i) cryptography and key management based schemes which are used by network coding as an
extra line of defense through assigning proper keys or cryptographic functions; (ii) schemes
that allow legitimate nodes to add redundancy to their information flows by applying an
appropriate secure network codes algorithm; (iii) cooperative schemes which are able to detect
compromised nodes and isolate them from the other legitimate nodes. This categorization of
the security schemes against Byzantine fabrication, eavesdropping, and entropy attacks is also
demonstrated in Table 3.2.
3.4.1 Countermeasures to Eavesdropping Attacks
3.4.1.1 Cryptography and Key Management based Schemes
The compromise of even a single node in WNs can reveal the secret keys and for that reason
all its messages can be decrypted easily. Therefore, key distribution is a vital requirement of
WNs. Moreover, the basic communication patterns of WNs differ from traditional networks’
patterns since key-distribution techniques need to scale to networks with hundreds or thousands
of nodes. A simple approach for distributing the keys in WNs is to pre-configure the network
with a shared unique symmetric key for each node. However, we need to establish a lot of keys
and distribute them to all nodes of the network. On the other hand, public-key cryptography
(e.g., Diffie-Hellman key scheme) is another option which is useful in wireless networks. Besides,
bootstrapping keys which are based on a trusted base station is another solution for key
distribution [124]. In this case, all the processes related to the establishment and distribution
of the keys are done by the base station and each node only needs to share a key with the
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base station. However, this mechanism makes the base station a single point of failure and for
that reason this security mechanism is considered as weak one.
3.4.1.2 Security via Network Codes
By exploiting appropriate network codes, it is possible to prevent eavesdropper from ob-
taining meaningful information from the eavesdropped data. Based on the use of appropriate
network codes, there is the opportunity to mitigate a significant devastating effect of eaves-
dropping attack in network coding-enabled WNs. By specific definition of an eavesdropper
model, which is described in [17], in network coding-enabled WNs there are the following three
different security levels for network coding systems: Shannon security level, weak security level
and computational security level. Preparing a network coding system, which supports the
Shannon security level, is not practical as it is feasible only under ideal assumption. Moreover,
for the weak security level, the authors show that it requires a sufficiently large filed size.
Finally, by utilizing cryptographic approaches, the computational security can be achieved in
practical NC-enabled WNs.
3.4.1.3 Security via Cooperative Mechanisms
In case of eavesdropping attacks, the authors in [55] studied a cooperative scheme with
special emphasis on three different nodes in the NC-enabled WNs. First, they consider nice
but curious nodes, which they do not ignore the data for which they are not the intended
receivers. In the second type, the eavesdropper is able to wiretap a subset of network links.
Finally, the third type of attacker is a worst-case eavesdropper who is given full access to all
the traffic in the network
3.4.2 Countermeasures to Entropy Attacks
In contrast to the other treats and attacks which have been mentioned above, the entropy
attacks have been emerged recently. Hence, only a limited number of defense mechanisms
have been proposed for entropy attacks. In the context of entropy attacks, an attacker creates
packets that contain information, which has been already known by the other sensors, and
send them to the next nodes. The result is a severe degradation of the system performance.
An efficient symmetric-key based authentication scheme with network coding, called PMAC
was proposed by Cheng et al. in [126]. In particular, their approach requires that any node
can construct a valid MAC (tag) for any legitimate block it wants to upload. This idea can
resist against entropy attacks.
The main research in this topic was done by [111], where the authors consider two local and
global entropy attacks. The attack that produces coded packets that are non-innovative to
local neighbor nodes is called local entropy attack. A main goal of attacker in global entropy
attacks is that producing coded packets which seems innovative to local neighbor nodes but
they are non-innovative to at least an outlying downstream node. The simulations in this
work show the impact of their solution to the entropy attacks. Moreover, they present the
difficulties in defending against a global entropy attack. However, developing an extremely
efficient countermeasure mechanism against entropy attacks still is required and it is an ongoing
research.
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3.4.3 Countermeasures to Byzantine Fabrication (pollution) Attacks
3.4.3.1 Cryptography and Key Management based Schemes
Due to the main principle of NC, according to which the intermediate nodes employ coding
operations to mix (i.e. recode) the incoming packets, the NC-enabled networks are vulnerable
to a severe security threat known as pollution attack. According to this kind of attack an
adversary injects into the NC-enabled network polluted packets that propagate quickly into
other legitimate packets and corrupt bunches of them because of the re-coding process that
take place at the intermediate nodes of the NC-enabled network. Consequently, pollution
attacks lead to network resource waste. In this sense, detection of pollution attacks is of
utmost importance for NC-enabled networks. To address pollution attacks, a number of
cryptographic based schemes have been proposed in [19, 21, 24, 111,127–130]. Specifically, the
proposed cryptographic schemes include Homomorphic Hash Function (HHF) [20,113] , Homo-
morphic digital signatures [23, 24], and Homomorphic Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
schemes [25,26,115] for NC-enabled systems. However, these solutions have several drawbacks,
when they are applied to NC-enabled WNs, due to the fact that they are computationally
expensive and they cannot be supported by the resource constrained NC-enabled WNs. More-
over, trusted party schemes and Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are used as solutions for
ensuring security in NC-enabled WNs. In addition, the key pre-distribution schemes emerge
as appropriate schemes for NC-enabled WNs that can afford less computation processes.
Furthermore, according to [55] it is possible to design a secret key distribution scheme that
requires only a small number of pre-stored keys by exploiting the benefits of network coding.
Nevertheless, the proposed scheme ensures that shared-key connectivity is established with
probability one and that the mobile node is provably oblivious to the distributed keys. Pollu-
tion attacks can be considered as two types: data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks.
These types of pollution attacks are further discussed as follows:
1. Data Pollution:
In data pollution attacks the adversary targets at modifying (i.e. corrupting) the content
of the transmitted packet. There are two main types of security schemes against data
pollution attacks: cryptographic schemes ( [19]- [2]) and information-theoretic schemes
( [21], [22]).
Cryptographic schemes: These schemes assume that the adversaries are confined in
terms of computation process. The sources append additional verification information
to the end of the coded packets. This allows intermediate nodes to verify the coded
packets and filter out the polluted ones. This type of schemes includes the homomorphic
hashing schemes, the homomorphic signature schemes and the homomorphic MAC-based
schemes.
• homomorphic hashing schemes are based on a homomorphic hash function which is
applied by the source node to the packets. One of the well-known homomorphic
hashing scheme is proposed in [19] by Krohn et. al. This scheme enables intermediate
nodes to verify on-the-fly the transmitted packets. For that reason, they use
homomorphism to compose multiple blocks inputs into a single value. Additionally,
by supporting cooperation between legitimate nodes, authors in [20] extended the
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previous work (i.e., [19]) and further reduced the expensive computation cost of
hash functions. However, this scheme requires additional secure communication
channels in order to transmit the calculated hash values to the intermediate nodes.
• homomorphic signature schemes appeared by Charles et. al in [131] for the first
time. According to the proposed scheme in [131], the nodes are enabled to sign any
linear combination of their incoming packets and produce a corresponding signature
for each linear combination. Then, the homomorphic property of the signatures
allows the next nodes to check the integrity of the content of the native packets.
Another signature-based scheme was proposed by Yu et al. [24]. This idea is a kind
of homomorphic signature function which resists against pollution attacks. In this
scheme, the source signs its messages using its private key, and the forwarders verify
the messages by using the public key. The authors believe that a hash collision is
equivalent to solve a Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). In the proposed scheme
in [24], any extra secure communication channel is not required. Moreover, the
experimental results show that its verification efficiency is improved up to 10 times
compared to the other related works (i.e. CJLs scheme [131]). Finally, the authors
in [2] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme for both linear and XOR NC to
prevent pollution attacks.
The authors in [114] also present two signature schemes for network coding to pre-
vent pollution attacks. The proof of their first scheme relies on the co-computational
Diffie-Hellman problem which is slightly stronger in comparing to the Diffie-Hellman
problem. Both two approaches are based on a single public key that can be used to
sign many linear spaces.
Zhao et al. [23] designed a signature scheme to maintain network coding properties
for file distribution. In this scheme, the source calculates a signature from the
spanned subspace and broadcasts this signature to all nodes. They use a standard
public-key method and the verification is accomplished by checking the membership
of encoded block in the spanned subspace. The authors proved that breaking this
scheme is as hard as solving a Diffie–Hellman Problem (DHP).
An efficient scheme for securing XOR network coding was presented for the first
time in [2]. The authors studied the integrity of XOR coded-packets by proposing
a messages authentication code scheme; however this scheme is vulnerable to tag
pollution attacks. In particular, they assume that each node picks a fixed number of
keys randomly from a large global key pool and a public key. Through meticulously
managing the key pool size and the number of keys which each node picks, the
authors assure that any two nodes have certain probability to find some shared
keys. The source uses its keys to generate message authentication codes (tags) for
its messages. Since the forwarders have the shared keys and thus they verify the
MACs of received messages by using their shared keys.
• homomorphic MACs schemes rely on message authenticated information which
is added at the end of the native packets. Agrawal and Boneh in [25] proposed
the basic definition of homomorphic MAC. However, this idea is susceptible to tag
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pollution attacks.
In [115], Kehdi et. al presented a homomorphic MAC scheme to detect data
pollution attacks based on the subspace properties of RLNC, but it requires a high
bandwidth overhead.
A practical defense scheme, called DART, against pollution attacks in network
coding for wireless mesh networks was proposed in [132]. It is based on checksums
which are very efficient to create and verify. Each node uses a checksum to ver-
ify only those packets that were received before the checksum itself was created.
However, the delayed key distribution which is used in this scheme requires a clock
synchronization of all the nodes.
Information-theoretic schemes. These schemes are characterized by considerable
computation performance compared to the cryptographic schemes. However, they are
not able to detect the polluted packets at the intermediate nodes of the network and
also they can handle only a limited number of compromised nodes [21], [22].
2. Tag Pollution:
In tag pollution attacks, the adversary targets at modifying the tags appended to the
end of the coded packets. There are few security schemes against tag pollution attacks.
First of all, the authors in [26] proposed the RIPPLE scheme to counteract against
the tag pollution challenge. This work is based on symmetric cryptography for NC
authentication. RIPPLE allows a node to efficiently detect polluted packets and encode
only the authenticated (i.e., verified) ones. However, the global synchronization among
all nodes is the main issue of this scheme.
Furthermore, the authors in [3] propose the MacSig scheme which is tag pollution
immune. The authors have presented a hybrid mechanism which enables the use of
homomorphic MACs and one homomorphic signature. The basic idea is to pad each
source packet with an extra symbol to make it orthogonal to a given vector. In addi-
tion, a signature is also appended at the end for resisting against tag pollution attacks.
Moreover, a double-random key distribution method is proposed in [3]. However, a consid-
erable bandwidth overhead is incurred due to the indexes of the keys added to the packets.
Finally, a key pre-distribution based tag scheme for practical NC has been proposed
in [4]. By using this scheme, it enables all intermediate and sink nodes to verify the
correctness of the received data messages. According to this key pre-distribution scheme,
a KDC is responsible for distributing the keys. The KDC allocates secret key vectors at
the source node to produce tags. Moreover, it assigns two secret key vectors to each
node to check the correctness of its received packets. The authors believe that KEPTE
can resist against tag pollution. The authors showed that this approach can be used as
a practical network coding scheme.
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3.4.3.2 Security via Network Codes
By exploiting appropriate network codes, it is possible to detect and correct corrupted
packets, and there is opportunity to mitigate a significant devastating effect of Byzantine
attacks (pollution attack) in network coding-enabled WNs. However, the mechanisms [116–118]
that provide error detection and error correction may lead to some undesired problems. An
error detection scheme creates monitoring overhead and there is a possibility to the sensors
to correct the errors only after occurring pollution attacks, which may bring about epidemic
disruptive problems for an NC system.
3.4.3.3 Security via Cooperative Mechanisms
Cooperative schemes that arise from network coding and can improve the verification
efficiency. In these schemes, users not only cooperate to distribute content, but also cooper-
ate to protect the rest sensors against adversary users in NC-enabled WNs. Moreover, the
cooperative schemes for NC-enabled WNs are able to detect compromised nodes and isolate
the adversary nodes [20, 119, 120]. In [20], one of the most famous cooperative schemes is
presented. It is an efficient scheme to prevent Byzantine attacks against bogus alert messages
based on secure random checksums. Another cooperative mechanism is a watchdog, which
detects and removes adversaries by dynamically adjusting the routing paths [121]. It consists
of the following three phases: monitoring, detecting, and isolating the malicious nodes. After
monitoring and detection phases, nodes inform each other about these malicious nodes and
finally they run the isolating phase. However, due to the significant overhead produced, this
mechanism is not efficient for WNs.
The algebraic watchdog presented by Kim et al [122] have proposed a network in which
the participants check their neighborhood locally to enable a secure global network. According
to the homomorphism property of the used hash functions, all the intermediate nodes in the
pollution attack model are able to verify the validity of the encoded packets on-the-fly prior
to mixing them algebraically. As a result, the intermediate nodes can collaborate to verify the
transit packets and the polluted packets will be dropped early and malicious nodes can be
detected and isolated.
Le and Markopoulou introduced a homomorphic MAC scheme, called SpaceMac [123].
SpaceMac allows a node to verify the received messages if they belong to a specific subspace.
Moreover, by using SpaceMac, the authors have proposed another cooperative scheme to
detect and locate the adversary nodes.
3.5 Conclusion
Wireless networks are characterized by limitations that can affect the advancement of the
wireless communications. These limitations are related to low communication bandwidth,
packet loss and power consumption.
Towards this direction, the application of NC technology in several networks, such as CPSs
and WSNs, leading to NC-enabled WNs, can be a promising solution. Recent research efforts
show that NC technology can provide significant benefits to WSNs in terms of improvement in
network capacity and robustness among others. However, due to the fact that NC technology
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enables the intermediate nodes to manipulate and mix incoming data packets from neighboring
nodes as well as transmit data packets between them, security issues are raised in NC-enabled
WSNs.
Additionally, these security issues can be exploited by attackers to compromise the security
of the wireless networks, which is a critical factor for their success. Therefore, in this chapter,
we have focused on a survey of existing NC-enabled WNs attacks that can potentially have
a negative impact on the security of the whole network. Furthermore, we have presented
mitigation approaches against the most common attacks, and have positioned these categories.
Our objective was to highlight the current limitations, and provide a basis on which to build
more reliable and efficient defense mechanisms against these attacks for NC-enabled WNs.
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Chapter 4
Efficient MAC-based for Secure
XOR NC
“In theory, theory and practice are the
same. In practice, they are not.”
Albert Einstein
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been recently used in a plethora of applications
of many different areas, such as surveillance monitoring, environmental monitoring, traffic
control, natural disaster prevention and e-health. However, WSNs are characterized by low
communication bandwidth and power consumption constraints. Towards this direction, XOR
Network Coding (NC) is a promising solution for WSNs. Nevertheless, XOR NC is vulnerable
to pollution attacks, where adversaries (i.e., compromised intermediate nodes) inject into the
network corrupted packets that prevent the destination nodes from decoding correctly. This has
as a result, not only leads to network resource wasting, but also reduces the energy efficiency
at the intermediate nodes. In this sense, pollution attacks constitute a serious threat against
WSNs (i.e., resource-constrained wireless networks) that should be addressed. Therefore, in this
chapter, we propose an efficient Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based scheme providing
resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled WSNs. Our results show that the
proposed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared to other competitive schemes for
securing XOR NC against pollution attacks in resource-constrained wireless networks, in terms
of communication bandwidth and computational complexity.
4.1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks can support many important applications such as remote
environmental monitoring and target tracking, and have gained worldwide attention in recent
years as a part of the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. Basically, the sensors in
WSNs are small, with limited processing and computing resources. Thus, they inherit the
limitations of WSNs in terms of communication bandwidth, reliability and power consumption
that should be addressed. Thus, Network Coding (NC) can be a promising solution for WSNs,
since it is a technique that can provide network capacity improvement and lower energy
consumption [5–7]. More precisely, due to the lightweight complexity which XOR Network
Coding (NC) has, it can be an encouraging solution for WSNs. Nevertheless, XOR NC is
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vulnerable to pollution attacks, where adversaries (i.e., compromised intermediate nodes)
inject into the network corrupted packets that prevent the destination nodes from decoding
correctly. Even a small proportion of corrupted packets can quickly propagate into other
packets via recoding, occurred at the intermediate nodes, and lead to infection of a larger
number of packets. This has as a result not only network resource wasting, but also reduces
energy efficiency of the nodes.
Therefore, in this chapter, we propose an efficient Message Authentication Code (MAC)-
based scheme providing resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled wireless
networks. Our results show that the proposed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared
to the scheme proposed in [2], in terms of communication bandwidth and computational
complexity. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme in [2] is the most competitive
scheme in the literature for securing XOR NC-enabled wireless networks.
Therefore, the main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose an efficient Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based scheme providing
resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled. Our proposed scheme makes
use of a number of MACs which are appended to the end of each native packet.
• We discuss the communication overhead and computational complexity incurred by the
use of our proposed scheme, as well as the comparison of these overheads with one the
most competitive scheme [2] in the literature.
• We present the key distribution model which is adopted by our proposed scheme.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the network
model of the WSN scenario, where XOR NC is applied. In addition, in this Section, we present
the adversary model of this XOR NC-enabled WSN, as well as the key distribution model
which is adopted by our proposed scheme. In Section 4.3, our proposed scheme is provided.
Subsequently, the security analysis of our proposed scheme is given in Section 4.4. In Section
4.5, the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme is analyzed. Finally, Section 4.6
concludes the chapter.
4.2 Models and Assumptions
In this section, we provide the network model of the WSN scenario, where XOR NC is
applied. Moreover, we provide the adversary model of this XOR NC-enabled WSN, as well as
the key distribution model which is adopted by our proposed scheme.
4.2.1 Network Model
Our XOR NC-enabled WSN can be modeled as a directed multigraph (S, I, e) which
consists of the following components, as it is also shown in Figure 4.1:
• Source node S: We have a source S (i.e., a sensor node) which wants to multicast its
messages. To achieve that, each message is divided into a sequence of packets and these
packets are multicasted. Each packet consists of a number of codewords.
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Figure 4.1: The Network Model of our XOR NC-enabled WSN.
• Non-source node set I: This set includes the intermediate nodes (i.e., relay nodes)
and the destination node which recode and decode packets. In Figure 4.1, the set of
non-source nodes is represented as: I = {I1, ..., Ij , D}.
• Link set e: This set consists of all the links in the network. As a link is defined as the
connection between each pair of two nodes. In Figure 4.1, the set of links is represented
as: e = {e1, ..., ew}.
We consider two types of packets: native packets and coded packets. Native packets are
packets generated at the source node. On the other hand, coded packets are packets which
are encoded and recoded at the source and intermediate nodes. However, for simplicity, we
refer to them as packets when it is not required to distinguish the native from the coded
packets. At the setup phase and according to the assumption made by the most existing
schemes [19], [126], the source divides each message into a sequence of native packets and
partitions them into generations. In our model, the source S wants to send a number of native
packets (i.e. M1,M2, · · ·,Mn) to the destination D. Each native packet Mi, which is divided
into m codewords, can be represented as a row vector as follows:
Mi = (mi,1,mi,2, · · ·,mi,m), (4.1)
where i = 1, · · ·, n.
Each codeword stands in a finite field Fp, where p is a power of prime number. Our
model encodes the codewords over the field of size 2. Typically, each codeword is 256-bit long
(blog2 pc).
63
Additionally, we denote the coded packet as E, which can be represented as following
E = α1M1 ⊕ α2M2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αnMn, (4.2)
where αi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, · · ·, n. The intermediate and destination nodes use the received
coded packets E to verify the native packets.
4.2.2 Adversary Model
We assume that the source node and the destination node are always trusted and there
is not any possibility to be forged. However, the intermediate nodes can be compromised.
A compromised node can play the role of an adversary that is able to wiretap all the data
packets that are transmitted over the network. The adversary’s goal is to achieve pollution
attack. Moreover, it is considered that the adversaries have limitations in computation power,
and thus, they can only perform in polynomial-time.
4.2.3 Key Distribution Model
We assume that a set of keys are distributed to all participant nodes in a secure and
authenticated manner by a Key Distribution Center (KDC) according to our key distribution
model. In this Section, we provide a brief description of our key distribution model that
we have adopted for our proposed MAC-based scheme against pollution attacks in XOR
NC-enabled WSNs.
According to our key distribution model, if the keys are distributed properly, then no
coalition of c compromised nodes can deceive another node. It is shown in [133] that in order
to resist against c compromised nodes, the number of the keys at the source must be c+ 1
times larger than the number of the shared keys at the relay/destination nodes. This model
allows each verifier to obtain a number of shared keys in order to verify the coded packets. In
our proposed scheme, this key distribution model assigns only one key to the intermediate and
destination nodes so that they verify the received coded packet. Only one key is assigned to
each intermediate and destination node, since in case that more than one key is assigned then
there is the possibility to verify the coded packet more than once. However, this possibility
needs more computational complexity.
4.3 Proposed MAC-based Scheme
In this section, we present the proposed MAC-based scheme against pollution attacks in
XOR NC-enabled WSNs. Our proposed scheme is based on the secure XOR NC MAC-based
scheme, defined by Yu et al. [2]. In this scheme, the source appends multiple MACs (tags)
to each native data packet, where each MAC can authenticate only a part of the packet and
the parts authenticated by different MACs are overlapped. Thus, multiple forwarders can
collaboratively verify different parts of packet using the MACs with their own shared keys.
It is shown that by carefully controlling the overlapping between the parts authenticated by
different MACs, this scheme can filter polluted packets in a few hops with a high probability.
Our scheme is defined as a triple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
(Setup, MAC, Verify) as follows:
•Setup:
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The KDC distributes the required keys to all nodes, the source node sets the security
parameters and uses the assigned keys to generate the corresponding MACs (tags).
•MAC:
The source node calculates and appends a number of MACs (tags) to the end of each
native packet.
•Verify:
Verification is based on the coded packets, the appended MACs (tags), and the shared keys.
If verification succeeds, the received packets will be accepted and used for further recoding or
decoding. Otherwise, the received packets are discarded.
The summary of notations used in this chapter is presented in Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Summary of Notations
Parameter Meaning
n The number of native packets per
generation
m The number of codewords of each
native packet
l The number of MACs
p The size of finite field and each code-
word
Mi Each native packet
mj Each coded packet
h The hash function
Ki,j The key
idi,j The index of the key
rj The index of u codewords
u The number of codewords used for
each MAC
c The number of compromised nodes
4.3.1 The Construction of the MAC-based Scheme
The construction of the proposed MAC-based scheme consists of the following:
• Setup
Initially, the source node defines the number of MACs (tags) appended to the end of each
native packet. This number of MACs is denoted as l. Then, the source node chooses
randomly a value u which is the number of codewords that will be used in the generation
process of each MAC. To define the codewords, that will be used in the generation of the
l MACs, the source node makes use of l random integers r1, r2, ..., rl, where rj ∈ [1,m]
for j = 1, ..., l. These random integers are calculated based on a pseudo-random function.
Each rj represents the indexes of the u codewords that will be used in the generation
process of each MAC. Also, a hash function h : Fup → Fp, where Fp is a finite field of size
p, is defined by the source node. This hash function will be used by the source node to
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create the hash value of the u codewords. Then, based on the number of MACs (i.e., l),
the KDC distributes l keys k1, k2, ..., kl to the source node. Finally, the KDC selects,
based on the key distribution model, described in Section 4.2.3, one key from those l
keys and distributes it to each non-source node.
• MAC
The source node calculates l MACs (tags) and appends them to the end of each native
packet. Each MAC is calculated as follows:
MACi,j = E(idi,j , rj , hi,j)ki,j , (4.3)
Where E(.) denotes encryption using the key ki,j , which is one of the l keys, distributed
by the KDC, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., l. In addition, idi,j denotes the index of this
key, rj is the index of u codewords, and hi,j is the output of the hash function h taking
as input u codewords. More precisely, for XOR NC, the hash function h is defined as
follows:
hi,j = mi,rj,1 ⊕ ...⊕mi,rj,u , (4.4)
where i = 1, ..., n, and j = 1, ..., l.
Then, the source node transmits the following:
(Mi, idi,1,MACi,1, ..., idi,l,MACi,l), (4.5)
where i = 1, ..., n.
We illustrate an example of the MAC generation in Figure 4.2.
• Verify
Each non-source node (i.e., intermediate and destination nodes) holds a key which was
distributed by the KDC as it has been mentioned in Setup phase. Using this key, the
non-source node decrypts the corresponding MAC of the received coded packet. Thus,
the non-source node obtains the indexes of the u codewords and the value of the hash
function h, that was calculated in the source node. Afterwards, the non-source node
calculates the hash value h
′
of the codewords that correspond to the obtained indexes,
according to Equation 4.4, and compares it with the obtained hash value h. If they are
equal, the received coded packet is considered as uncorrupted and is accepted, otherwise,
the received coded packet is discarded.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this Section, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme in terms of the probability
that a corrupted packet can not be detected by the next hop and how this probability can be
affected by the number of codewords (u) as well as the number of MACs (l).
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Figure 4.2: An example of tag generation. The source node has to calculate and append 4
MACs to the end of the native packet Mi, which consists of 8 codewords (i.e., mi,1, ...,mi,8).
To generate the 4 MACs, a pseudo-random function is used firstly to generate 4 random values
(i.e., r1, ..., r4), one for each MAC. Based on these random values, the source node defines the
indexes of the codewords, which will be the input to the hash function h in order to calculate
the corresponding hash values h(1), ..., h(4).
We have considered that the adversary (i.e., the compromised node) knows the distributed
key and thus, based on Equations 4.3 and 4.4, he is able to identify which codewords are
verified by the corresponding MAC. Hence, he can corrupt these codewords and generate a
false MAC for the corrupted packet. However, the corrupted codeword can be detected by the
next node with a high probability.
Theorem 2. The probability that a corrupted codeword in one MAC is not detected by the
next node is not greater than (1− u
m
)l−1.
Proof. In our proposed scheme, each MAC verifies the integrity of u codewords out of m
codewords. Therefore, the probability that each codeword can occur in one MAC is
u
m
.
However, the probability that this codeword does not occur in other MACs is calculated as
follows:
poccur = (1−
u
m
)l−1 (4.6)
Consequently, if an adversary corrupts a codeword of a MAC, then the probability that the
corrupted codeword will not be detected by the next node is given by Equation 4.6.
From Theorem 2, it is clear that the probability of a corrupted packet not to be detected
by the next node is given by Equation 4.6 as well. In Figure 4.3, based on Equation 4.6, we
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Figure 4.3: Corrupted Packet Non-Detection Probability in terms of the Number of Codewords.
illustrate this probability in terms of the number of codewords for different number of MACs.
As it is shown in Figure 4.3, by increasing the number of codewords, the probability of a
corrupted packet not to be detected by the next node decreases.
In addition, the probability of a corrupted packet not to be detected by the next node is
also affected by the number of MACs.
Theorem 3. By increasing the number of MACs, the probability that a corrupted packet not
to be detected by the next hop decreases.
Proof. Suppose that the total number of compromised nodes is c. Consequently, the adversary
can totally obtain c keys. Thus, the probability that the adversary can decrypt one MAC of
the coded packet is denoted as pk and defined as follows:
pk =
c
l
(4.7)
Hence, adopting Equation (12) proposed in [2], the probability that the adversary, holding
c keys, can decrypt c MACs out of the l MACs, is the following:
pdec(c) =
(
l
c
)
pck(1− pk)l−c (4.8)
where c l.
As a result, the probability that a corrupted packet not to be detected by the next hop is
given by Equation 4.8 as well. According to this Equation, it is clear that by increasing the
number of MACs, the probability that the corrupted packet not to be detected by the next
hop decreases.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the performance of our MAC-based scheme in terms of commu-
nication bandwidth and computational complexity.
4.5.1 Communication Bandwidth
To calculate the communication overhead of our proposed scheme, we take into considera-
tion: a) the number of codewords of the native packet, b) the l MACs appended to the end of
each native packet, and c) the l key indexes appended to the end of each native packet as well.
Each native packet has m codewords and each codeword requires log2 p bits. Thus, the
bit-length of each native packet is m ∗ log2 p bits.
In Figure 4.4, based on Equation 4.8, we illustrate this probability in terms of the number
of MACs for different number of compromised nodes.
On the other hand, according to Equation 4.3, each MAC consists of a hash value, a
random number, and the key index. Based on Equation 4.4, the hash value is the XOR result
of u codewords and thus, it requires log2 p bits.
Moreover, the random number, used to identify the indexes of the codewords, requires
log2m bits. Finally, the index of the key requires log2 |l| bits. Consequently, the bit-length of
l MACs is l ∗ (log2 p+ log2 m+ log2 |l|) bits. In addition, each key index appended to the
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Figure 4.4: Corrupted Packet Non-Detection Probability in terms of the Number of MACs.
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end of each native packet requires log2 |l| bits. Therefore, the bit-length of l key indexes is
l ∗ (log2 |l|) bits. However, similar to [2], in order to reduce the length of the coded packets in
our scheme, only one key index can be appended to the end of each native packet.
Thus, our MAC-based scheme has the following communication overhead:
l ∗ (log2 p+ log2 m+ log2 |l|) + log2 |l|
m ∗ log2 p
(4.9)
Assuming that the number of MACs (i.e., l) is constant, m is equal to 256, and p is 256-bit
long, the value of log2 |l| and the value of log2m are negligible compared to the value of
log2 p. Hence, from the Equation 4.9, the communication overhead is calculated as
l
m , which
means that our scheme has the same communication overhead as the proposed scheme in [2].
However, our proposed scheme can detect the corrupted packets earlier (i.e., next node) and
thus, communication bandwidth is saved.
4.5.2 Computational Complexity
According to Equations 4.3 and 4.4, (u− 1) XOR operations are needed to generate each
MAC in our scheme. Thus, the generation of l MACs requires l ∗ (u − 1) XOR operations.
Nevertheless, the proposed scheme in [2] requires l ∗ u XOR operations to generate l MACs.
Moreover, to verify a coded packet in each non-source node, (u− 1) XOR operations are
required in our scheme, since each non-source node calculates the hash value of the codewords
that corresponds to the obtained indexes, according to Equation 4.4. On the other hand,
the scheme proposed in [2] requires l ∗ u XOR operations for verification. In Figure 4.5, we
illustrate the number of XOR operations required to verify the coded packet in our scheme
and the scheme proposed in [2]. It is worthwhile to mention that, in contrast to the scheme
proposed in [2], our scheme does not depend on the number of MACs (i.e., l).
Table 4.2 summarizes the number of XOR operations required for MAC generation and
verification in our proposed scheme and the scheme proposed in [2]. According to Table 4.2,
our scheme requires less XOR operations in total than the scheme proposed in [2] and thus,
our scheme is more efficient in terms of computational complexity.
Table 4.2: Number of XOR Operations
XOR NC Proposed Scheme [2]
MAC l ∗ (u− 1) l ∗ u
Verify u− 1 l ∗ u
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Figure 4.5: The number of XOR operations required to verify a coded packet in terms of the
number of codewords in our proposed scheme and the scheme proposed in [2].
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient Message Authentication Code (MAC)-
based scheme providing resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled WSNs. Our
proposed scheme makes use of a number of MACs which are appended to the end of each native
packet. Our results show that the proposed MAC-based scheme is more efficient compared
to the scheme proposed in [2], in terms of communication bandwidth and computational
complexity. The proposed scheme in [2] is the most competitive scheme in the literature
for securing XOR NC against pollution attacks in resource-constrained wireless networks.
Particularly, our scheme saves communication bandwidth, since it detects corrupted packets
in the next hop with high probability, and its computational complexity is lower because it
requires less XOR operations than the scheme proposed in [2]. Moreover, we observe that
verification process in our proposed scheme is almost 5 to 10 times (l times) faster than [2].
71
72
Chapter 5
Advanced Homomorphic MAC for
Secure RLNC
“It doesn’t matter how beautiful your
theory is, it doesn’t matter how smart
you are. If it doesn’t agree with
experiment, it’s wrong.”
Richard Feynman
Network Coding (NC) has shown a considerable improvement in terms of capacity and
robustness compared to traditional store-and-forward transmission paradigm. However, since
the intermediate nodes in network coding-enabled networks have the ability to change the
packets en-route, network coding-enabled networks are vulnerable to pollution attacks where
a small number of polluted messages can corrupt bunches of legitimate messages. Recently,
research efforts have focused towards schemes for protecting the transmitted messages against
data pollution attacks. However, most of them are limited against tag pollution attacks. In
this chapter, we aim to propose four schemes which enable the intermediate and sink nodes to
detect and discard the polluted packets.
5.1 Introduction
Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) was proposed by Ho et al. in [18] as a fully
distributed approach for performing NC. In RLNC, each node selects randomly a set of
coefficients and uses them to make linear combinations of the incoming packets. Furthermore,
it is worthwhile to mention that RLNC achieves the same capacity as that achieved by the
Max-flow Min-cut theorem [30]. However, RLNC is susceptible to data pollution attacks,
where an adversary (e.g., compromised intermediate node) injects into the network corrupted
packets that prevent the destination nodes from decoding correctly. This has as a result not
only network resource waste but also increases energy waste at the nodes [128]. Hence, during
the past few years, several schemes have been presented to provide resistance against data
pollution attacks. Among them, those based on homomorphic Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) are considered as a low-complexity solution for data pollution attacks [3, 25, 115].
However, most of the homomorphic MAC schemes are vulnerable to tag pollution attack,
which was first defined by Li et al. in [26]. In tag pollution attacks, the adversaries modify
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tags (i.e., MACs) appended to the end of the coded packet. A tag is a piece of information
appended to the end of the coded packet to ensure integrity of the transmitted packet data.
Each tag has a fixed position in the coded packet and thus, it is easy for an adversary to
control its pollution.
Therefore, in this chapter, we present four schemes which can provide resistance against
pollution attacks. These schemes, based on the tag creation, are discussed in two parts. In
the first part, two homomorphic MAC-based schemes for network coding-enabled wireless
networks are discussed. The first proposed scheme called Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme,
which makes use of two types of tags (i.e., MACs and D-MACs) to provide resistance against
data pollution attacks and partially tag pollution attacks. The second proposed scheme is
called efficient Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme. This scheme makes use of the idea of Dual
Homomorphic MAC Scheme and a signature to provide resistance against data pollution
attacks and tag pollution attacks.
In the second part, the third scheme and fourth scheme are presented. The third scheme
called Null Space-based Homomorphic MAC Scheme, makes use of two types of tags, where
the first tags are based on the inner product of the native packet and keys, and the second tags
are based on the null space property. The fourth scheme, called an efficient Null Space-based
Homomorphic MAC Scheme, makes use of only one set of tags which can provide resistance
against data pollution and tag pollution attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we give an overview of
the background and related work on RLNC and secure RLNC in wireless networks. In Section
5.3, the proposed Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme is provided. Subsequently, the efficient
Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme is given in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, the Null Space-
based Homomorphic MAC Scheme is introduced. Furthermore, the efficient Null Space-based
Homomorphic MAC Scheme is proposed in 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Related Works
In this Section, we present related work on security schemes against pollution attacks in
random linear network coding-enabled wireless networks. In addition, we present the key
distribution mechanisms used by these security schemes.
This chapter focuses on the subject of security in linear network coding when passive
attackers are present. As mentioned earlier, network coding by itself and without employing
any security module has the ability to provide a certain level of inherent security due to the
fact that the data traveling through the network is constantly evolving by the intermediate
nodes. Therefore, at any given time, every network channel usually carries a symbol which is
not an exact copy of any of the original data symbols that are generated at the source nodes.
This innate security property which is inherited from the very fundamental characteristics
of network coding, sometimes satisfies the security needs of a network; however, for some
applications that require higher security assurance, additional security modules are needed.
5.2.1 Security schemes against pollution attacks in NC-enabled networks
Most of the research in the field of pollution attacks in network coding is focused on
two types of security schemes: cryptographic schemes [25], [114] and information-theoretic
schemes [21], [22].
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• Cryptographic schemes. These schemes rely on additional verification information which
is added by the sources through cryptographic techniques. This allows intermediate
nodes to verify the original messages and filter out the polluted ones. This category
includes the homomorphic hashing schemes, the homomorphic signature schemes and
the homomorphic MACs.
1. homomorphic hashing schemes are based on a homomorphic hash function which
is applied by the source to the messages. These schemes rely also on additional
secure communication channels in order to transmit the calculated hash values to
the intermediate nodes. A well-known homomorphic hashing scheme is proposed
by Krohn et al. in [19] which enables the intermediate nodes to verify on-the-fly.
The extension of this work was presented in [20] which is focused on network
coding-enabled networks and further reduces the expensive computation cost of
hash functions in each intermediate nodes by enabling cooperation verification.
2. homomorphic signature schemes were introduced for the first time by Charles, Jain
and Lauter in [131] and have been based on Weil pairing over elliptic curves. The
homomorphic property of the signatures in these schemes allows nodes to sign any
linear combination of the incoming packets without contacting the signing entity.
The calculation of signature covers the whole augmented message. In [24], Yu
et al. proposed a homomorphic signature function which allows the relay nodes
to verify the received messages by generating the signatures without contacting
the signing entities. In Yu’s scheme, the communication does not need any extra
secure communication channel. Their experimental results show that its verification
efficiency is improved up to 10 times compared to the other related work (i.e., CJLs
scheme [131]). Moreover, in [21], an alternative lightweight scheme is proposed. It
is much faster rather than the Yu’s scheme, but it is not as secure as the first one.
3. homomorphic MACs are based on appending some extra information to the original
message. The basic definition of homomorphic MAC is defined by Agrawal et al.
in [25] which allows the integrity checking of the network coded data. However,
this idea is susceptible to tag pollution attacks. Kehdi et al. [115] presented a
homomorphic MAC scheme to detect pollution attacks based on the subspace
properties of random linear network coding, where null keys for verification are
used. As a lot of null keys are used in each generation, a high bandwidth overhead
can be incurred. RIPPLE [26] was proposed to counteract against the tag pollution
problem. This work is based on a symmetric key based scheme for network
coding authentication. RIPPLE allows a node to efficiently detect corrupted
packets and encode only the authenticated (i.e., verified) ones. However, the global
synchronization among all nodes is the problem of this scheme. In [3], the authors
presented a hybrid-key cryptography approach which could achieve authentication
in the presence of both data and tag pollution attacks. To achieve this, a number
of tags and a signature are appended to each transmitted message. However,
the signature which is necessary for preventing tag pollution is a time consuming
process.
• Information-theoretic schemes. The information-theoretic schemes benefit from the
reasonable computation performance in comparing to the cryptographic schemes, but
they have two main drawbacks. First of all, they are not able to detect the polluted
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messages at the intermediate nodes of the network. For example the work presented
in [21], which extends the random network coding, relies on coding redundant information
into the original messages allowing only the receivers to detect the polluted messages.
Furthermore, the information-theoretic schemes are characterized by the limitation on
the number of compromised nodes. These two drawbacks comprise the main motivation
to interest to the cryptographic schemes.
5.2.2 Key Distribution Model
Nowadays, in emerging multicast communication systems, (e.g., pay TV and videocon-
ferencing services), the key distribution is a challenging issue. There are various proposed
schemes for key distribution in multicast systems. Key distribution models can be categorized
in trusted-server schemes [134], public-key schemes and key pre-distribution schemes [135], [4].
The trusted-server and public-key schemes are infeasible to be used in wireless networks as
the wireless nodes (i.e., sensors) have limitations in terms of energy and computing processes.
On the other hand, key pre-distribution schemes are feasible to be used in wireless networks.
In these schemes, the shared keys are distributed among the nodes of a group in such a way
that every node in the group to be able to compute individually a common key associated
with that group. Two examples of key pre-distribution schemes are given as follows.
In MacSig which is an efficient subspace authentication scheme for NC and presented in [3],
the double-random key distribution has been proposed. This proposed key distribution model
includes two random procedures. First of all, they assign each node with a random set of keys;
next, the source node randomly selects a subset of keys from the key pools and uses these
keys to generate the MACs. However, it is necessary to attach the indexes these keys to each
packet. Hence, a considerable bandwidth overhead is incurred.
In KEPTE (Key Pre-distribution-based Tag Encoding) scheme [4], a key distribution
model for practical NC has been proposed. According to this key distribution model, a Key
Distribution Center (KDC) is responsible for the distribution of the keys. The KDC allocates
N secret vectors at the source node to produce N tags. Moreover, it assigns two secret vectors
to each node to check the correctness of its received packets.
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Part I
Dual Homomorphic MAC
77
5.3 A Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme
5.3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, NC has been used in various applications over different networks, such as wireless
mesh networks [5], wireless sensor networks [136] and peer-to-peer systems [6]. In contrast
to traditional and classical commodity flow, where information is only routed or replicated,
information flow can also employ coding operations at intermediate nodes. In [18], Random
linear Network Coding (RLNC) was studied as a fully distributed method for performing
network coding.
However, RLNC is more susceptible to data pollution attack than the traditional store-and-
forward approach. If a data pollution attack is not detected at the forwarders, then the sink
nodes will not be able to recover the source messages correctly. It is worthwhile to mention
that even a small number of polluted messages can infect a large number of downstream nodes
because the pollution propagates via recoding. Furthermore, RLNC-enabled networks are also
vulnerable to tag pollution attack, which is a more sophisticated type of pollution attack. In
tag pollution attack, the adversary targets at modifying (i.e., polluting) the tags carried by
the messages rather than modifying the content of the messages. It is possible for a message
with polluted tags to travel multiple hops until it is detected and discarded. Yet, this results
in a waste of network bandwidth. Specifically, a MAC or tag is a small piece of information
appended to the end of the message packet. This piece of information is the output of a
MAC function taking as inputs the message packet and a secret key. However, this solution is
vulnerable to tag pollution attacks.
In this section, we propose a new homomorphic MAC-based scheme, called Dual-Homomorphic
MAC (Dual-HMAC) for NC-enabled WNs in order to mitigate against both data pollution
attacks, and partially tag pollution attacks. In our scheme, the source generates multiple
MACs and Dual MACs (D-MACs) for each message. Each MAC ensures integrity of the
transmitted message and each D-MAC ensures integrity of the MACs. In other words, by
appending D-MACs, the proposed scheme mitigates partially tag pollution attacks.
5.3.2 Models and Assumptions
In this section, we provide the network model of NC-enabled wireless networks where our
proposed scheme is applied. Also we provide the adversary model of this kind of networks.
5.3.2.1 Network Model
In this chapter, similarly to Chapter 4, we assume that our network model is based on a
directed multigraph (S, I, E) which consists of the following components, as shown in Figure
5.1:
• Source node S: We have a source S which wants to multicast its messages. To achieve
that, each message is divided into a sequence of packets and these packets are multicasted.
Each packet consists of a number of symbols.
• Non-source node set I: This set includes the intermediate and destination nodes
which recode and decode packets.
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Figure 5.1: The network model of NC-enabled wireless networks where our proposed scheme
is applied.
• Link set E: This set consists of all the links in the network. As a link is defined the
connection between each pair of two nodes. In Figure 5.1, the set of links is represented
as: E = {e1, ..., e11}.
We consider two types of packets: native packets and coded packets. Native packets are
packets generated at the source node. On the other hand, coded packets are packets which
are encoded and recoded at the source and intermediate nodes.
However, for simplicity, we refer to them as packets when it is not required to distinguish
them between native and coded packets. At the setup phase and according to the assumption
made by the most existing schemes ( [19]- [126]), the source divides each message into a
sequence of native packets and partitions them into generations.
Thus, we consider that each generation consists ofm native packets denoted as u1,u2, ...,um.
Each packet ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is represented as a vector u1, u2, ..., un in the finite field Fnp ,
where p = 28 denotes the size of the finite field. In [137], it has been shown that 28 is usually
sufficient for practical use and convenient for computation. Then, the source S generates a
coded packet ui for each native packet ui by prefixing ui with the i
th unit vector of dimension m.
The coded packet is represented as a row vector in the finite field Fm+np as follows:
ui = (
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0, ui,1, · · · , ui,n) ∈ Fm+np (5.1)
79
Moreover, the source S transmits these coded packets to its neighbor nodes. An intermediate
node buffers its received packets ui temporarily and creates a coded packet y, which is a linear
combination of a number of h coded packets u1,u2, ...,uh belonging to the same generation.
The coded packet is represented as follows:
y =
h∑
i=1
αiui (5.2)
where each αi ∈ Fp is a random coefficient chosen by each intermediate node. A coded packet
y is considered to be valid if it is in the linear subspace spanned by the coded packets generated
at the source. This is denoted as y ∈ span {u1, · · · ,um}. In fact, when y is valid, these linear
combination coefficients are the first m symbols of the packet y. Otherwise, y is invalid and it is
denoted as y /∈ span {u1, · · · ,um} , which may be caused by transmission errors or pollution
attacks. At the destination side, when a sink node has obtained m linearly independent coded
packets, it can decode the coded packets, by using Gaussian eliminations [18], [138].
5.3.2.2 Adversary Model
Two types of pollution attacks are considered in our proposed schemes. The first one is
the data pollution attack, in which the adversary exploits the knowledge of the pre-shared key
to the compromised nodes in order to produce fake packet content. The main objective of the
adversary is to create polluted packets that will pass the packet content verification of the
next innocent intermediate nodes and cause incorrect decoding at the sink node.
The second type of pollution attacks includes the tag pollution attacks, in which the
adversary randomly modifies tags so that packets with legitimate content will be discarded
later from next intermediate nodes due to the corrupted tags. It is possible for a packet with
legitimate content and corrupted tags to travel multiple hops until it is detected and discarded.
Figure 5.2 represents a tag pollution attack scenario over our network model topology.
Particularly, two adversary nodes (i.e. I1 and I3) are considered in the scenario. The adversary
node I1 pollutes the tag t5 of the coded packet P1. However, the next nodes I4, I6, and I7
have the keys K1, K3 and K2 respectively, but not the key K5 corresponding to the polluted
tag t5. Thus, the polluted packet P1 will be accepted at the destination nodes I6, and I7.
On the other hand, the adversary node I3 pollutes the tag t4 of the coded packet P2. Since
the next node I5 has the key K4 which is the corresponding key to the polluted tag t4, the
polluted coded packet P2 is detected and discarded by I5.
5.3.3 Proposed Scheme: Dual Homomorphic MAC (Dual-HMAC)
In this section, we present our Dual-HMAC scheme, which mitigates data pollution and
partially tag pollution attacks for a network coding-enabled wireless networks. The Dual-
HMAC scheme’s outline, the construction and the correctness of the scheme as well as the key
distribution model are provided in this section.
Our proposed solution is based on the homomorphic MAC scheme, defined by Agrawal et
al. [25], and the MacSig scheme proposed in [3]. Additionally, our proposed scheme makes use
of additional MACs, termed as D-MACs, in order to resist data pollution and partially tag
pollution attacks. In contrast to the homomorphic MAC solution in [25], our proposed scheme
is not susceptible to tag pollution attacks. Particularly, our proposed scheme can achieve
resistance for half of the tags against tag pollution attack with significant low computational
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Figure 5.2: A tag pollution attack scenario over our network model topology.
complexity compared to the MacSig scheme, which uses a signature scheme characterized by a
much considerable computational overhead.
Our scheme consists of three steps, as it is depicted in Fig 5.3, in order to generate the
required MACs and D-MACs. In step 1, it computes a number of MACs (i.e., tags), for each
message, according to the keys which are chosen randomly from the first pool of keys. Then,
in step 2, it computes a number of D-MACs for the initial MACs, according to the keys which
are chosen from the second pool of keys. Finally, in step 3, the computed MACs and D-MACs
are appended to the message.
5.3.3.1 The Outline of the Dual-HMAC Scheme
In this section, we provide description of the proposed Dual-HMAC scheme with a formal
method. This scheme includes four steps: Setup, Tag generation, verification and encoding
detailed as follows:
1. Setup
• Key Distribution Centre (KDC) distributes the following two sets of secrete key
vectors to the source node S: KS = {k1,k2, · · · ,kl} ,kh ∈ Fm+n+1p and K
′
S ={
k
′
1,k
′
2, · · · ,k
′
l′
}
,k
′
h′ ∈ Fl+1p . KDC also distributes the following two subsets of
secrete vectors to all intermediate nodes and sink nodes: Kni = {k1, · · · ,kR} ,kr ∈
Fm+n+1p , and K
′
ni =
{
k
′
1, · · · ,k
′
R′
}
,k
′
r′ ∈ Fl+1p .
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Figure 5.3: The three main steps of Dual-HMAC scheme.
• Note that KS
⋂K′S = ∅, Kni ⊂ KS , K′ni ⊂ K′S , and if i 6= j, then Kni 6= Knj so as
K′ni 6= K
′
nj .
• Note that the subscriptions h, h′ , r and r′ represent the index of the key, which do
not change in different subsets. In other words, if kh = kr, then h = r; if kh′ = kr′ ,
then h
′
= r
′
. The detail of probabilistic key distribution algorithm will be described
in Section 5.3.3.4, as well as how to choose the key set size.
2. Tag generation
For every data packet ui ∈ Fm+np , the source uses the MAC (k1,k2, · · · ,kl,ui) and
D-MAC
(
k
′
1,k
′
2, · · · ,k
′
l′ , tui,1, · · · , tui,l
)
algorithms to generate the (l + l′) tags.
3. Verification
When a relay or sink node receives a coded packet y ∈ Fm+np with its tags, this node
checks the correctness of packet using the algorithm Verify via its pre-distributed keys
Kni and K
′
ni . If the output is 1, then the received coded packet y is considered to be a
correct one. Otherwise, this packet is discarded.
4. Encoding
When an intermediate node receives h encoded packets ui ∈ Fm+np (1 ≤ i ≤ h) , and they
all are checked or considered to be correct, a forward coded packet along with new tags is
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generated using the Combine
((
ui, tui,1, · · · tui,l, t
′
ui,1
, · · · , t′ui,l′
)h
i=1
, (ci)
h
i=1
)
algorithm
with locally randomly generated coefficients ci.
5.3.3.2 The Construction
In this subsection, we provide the construction of the scheme. Particularly, we present
the above-mentioned four algorithms, namely MAC, D-MAC, Combine and Verify in detail.
The algorithm MAC computes l tags for each data packet ui, and the algorithm D-MAC
computes another l
′
tags for the tags. Moreover, the algorithm Combine generates new tags
for a RLNC encoded packet. Furthermore, the algorithm Verify checks the correctness of a
data packet with all tags. Details of these four algorithms are described as follows:
1. MAC (KS , ui):
• Input: KS consists of l secrete vectors k1,k2, · · · ,kl ∈ Fm+n+1p , and the ith data
packet ui ∈ Fm+np as shown in Equation 5.1
• Output: l tags tui,1, tui,2, · · · , tui,l ∈ Fp for packet ui, where
tui,l = −
m+n∑
j=1
ui,jkl,j
 /kl,m+n+1 (5.3)
2. D-MAC
(
K′S , tui,1, · · · , tui,l
)
• Input: K′S consists of l
′
secrete vectors k
′
1,k
′
2, · · · ,k
′
l′ ∈ Fl+1p , and the l′ tags
tui,l ∈ Fp generated in Equation 5.3 for the packet ui ∈ Fm+np
• Output: l tags t′ui,1, t
′
ui,2
, · · · , t′
ui,l
′ ∈ Fp for packet ui, where
t
′
ui,l
′ = −
 l∑
j=1
tui,jk
′
l′ ,j
 /kl′ ,l+1 (5.4)
3. Combine
((
ui, tui,1, · · · tui,l, t
′
ui,1
, · · · , t′ui,l´
)h
i=1
, (ci)
h
i=1
)
• Input: h vectors ui ∈ Fm+np (1 ≤ i ≤ h) as shown in Equation 5.2, each with l + l
′
tags tui,1, · · · tui,l, t
′
ui,1
, · · · , t′
ui,l
′ ∈ Fp (1 ≤ i ≤ h), and h constants c1, · · · , ch ∈ Fp
• Output: a coded packet with l + l′ tags generated by
(
y, ty,1, · · · ty,l, t′y,1, · · · , t
′
y,l′
)
=
h∑
i=1
ci
(
ui, tui,1, · · · tui,l, t
′
ui,1, · · · , t
′
ui,l
′
)
(5.5)
4. Verify
(
Kni ,K
′
ni ,
(
y, ty,1, · · · ty,l, t′y,1, · · · , t
′
y,l′
))
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• Input: Kni consists of secrete vectors k1, · · · ,kR ∈ Fm+n+1p , {k1, · · · ,kR} ⊂
{k1, · · · ,kl} andK′ni consists of secrete vectors k
′
1, · · · ,k
′
R′ ∈ Fl+1p ,
{
k
′
1, · · · ,k
′
R′
}
⊂{
k
′
1,k
′
2, · · · ,k
′
l′
}
, as well as a RLNC encoded packet y ∈ Fm+np with l + l
′
tags
ty,1, · · · ty,l, t′y,1, · · · , t
′
y,l′ ∈ Fp
• Output: if
∀kr ∈ {k1, · · · ,kR}, δr =
m+n∑
j=1
yjkr,j
+ ty,rkr,m+n+1 = 0 (5.6)
and
∀k′
r′ ∈ {k
′
1, · · · ,k
′
R′}, δ
′
r′ =
 l∑
j=1
ty,jk
′
r′ ,j
+ t′
y,r′k
′
r′ ,l+1 = 0 (5.7)
then output 1; otherwise output 0.
5.3.3.3 The Correctness of Dual-HMAC
The proposed Dual-HMAC is going to be correct if the Verify algorithm could produce
output 1 for the valid data packet and the valid RLNC encoded packet. Rigorously speaking,
it should satisfy the following condition:
If Verify
(
Kni ,K
′
ni ,
(
ui,MAC(KS ,ui), D −MAC(K′S ,ui
))
= 1 and
If Verify
(
Knj ,K
′
nj ,
(
uj , tuj ,1, · · · tuj ,l, t
′
uj ,1
, · · · , t′
uj ,l
′
))
= 1, ∀j = 1, · · · , h, then
Verify
(
Knj ,K
′
nj , Combine
((
uj , tuj ,1, · · · tuj ,l, t
′
uj ,1
, · · · , t′
uj ,l
′
)h
j=1
, (cj)
h
j=1
))
= 1
Theorem 4. The first verification is correct.
Proof. According to the description of “Setup”, since Kni ⊂ KS , ∀kr ∈ Kni , there is a key
kl = kr and l = r. As a result, by letting y = ui,kl = kr, and substituting ty,r = tui,l using
Equation 5.3, it is for sure that δr = 0,∀kr ∈ Kni in Equation 5.6.
Similarly, since K′ni ⊂ K
′
S , ∀k′r′ ∈ K
′
ni , there is a key kl′ = kr′ and l
′
= r
′
. As a result,
by letting y = ui,kl′ = kr′ , and substituting t
′
y,r′ = t
′
ui,l
′ using Equation 5.4, it is for sure
that δ
′
r′ = 0, ∀k
′
r′ ∈ K
′
ni in Equation 5.7.
As a result, Verify
(
Kni ,K
′
ni ,
(
ui,MAC(KS ,ui), D −MAC(K′S ,ui
))
= 1
Theorem 5. The second verification is correct.
Proof. According to Equation 5.3, the tags are created in a way that kl is orthogonal to
the concatenation of ui and its l tags kl⊥(ui ‖ tui,l). This relationship is true for all
packets in the same generation, which represents as kl⊥Span {(ui ‖ tui,l)mi=1}. If Verify(
Knj ,K
′
nj ,
(
uj , tuj ,1, · · · tuj ,L, t
′
uj ,1
, · · · , t′
uj ,L
′
))
= 1, ∀j = 1, · · · , h, then kl⊥Span
{
(uj ‖ tuj ,l)hj=1
}
.
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Moreover, the algorithm Combine is a linear combination, which does not change the
subspace. Hence, (y ‖ ty,l) ∈ Span
{
(uj ‖ tuj ,l)hj=1
}
, kl⊥(y ‖ ty,l), and the Equation 5.6
δr = 0, ∀kr ∈ Kni . Similarly, we could derive δ
′
r′ = 0, ∀k
′
r′ ∈ K
′
ni . As a result, the output of
Verify is 1, and the second condition is also correct.
5.3.3.4 Our Key Distribution Model
In this thesis, we assume that a set of symmetric keys are distributed to all participant
nodes in a secure and authenticated manner through a key distribution scheme. In this section,
we provide the model of the key distribution scheme that we have adopted. A set system is a
pair (X,F ), where X is a finite set of elements and F is an ordered set of subsets of X.
Definition 1. A set system (X,F ) is called a c cover-free family (c-CFF) if for any c sets
A1, A2, ...Ac ∈ F and any other set B ∈ F , we have
B 6⊂
⋃c
J=1
Ai (5.8)
Definition 2. A set system (X,F ) is called a (c, d) cover-free family ((c, d)-CFF) if for
any c sets A1, A2, ...Ac ∈ F and any other set B ∈ F , we have∣∣∣B\⋃c
J=1
Aj
∣∣∣ > d (5.9)
We believe that if key assignment is done properly, no coalition of c nodes can fool another
node. Our key pre-distribution scheme considers two key pools which are available at the source
node. We use all these two sets for checking the message’s integrity. It is shown in [133] that in
order to resist against less than c compromised nodes, the cardinality of the key size at the source
must be (c+1) times larger than those key size at the relay/sink nodes, which could be expressed
as l ≥ (c+ 1)R, and l′ ≥ (c+ 1)R′ . More specifically, we claim that by this model, we can be
sure each verifier has some shared keys which can verify the integrity of messages. Our scheme
assigns two sets KS = {k1,k2, · · · ,kl} ,ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , K
′
S =
{
k
′
1,k
′
2, · · · ,k
′
l
′
}
,k
′
i
′ ∈ Fl+1p to a
source node which each has l = l
′
= |KS | =
∣∣∣K′S∣∣∣ = 12(1−δ)e(c+ 1)ln(1/q) keys. Moreover, we
distribute two sets Kni = {k1, · · · ,kR} ,kr ∈ Fm+n+1p , and K
′
ni =
{
k
′
1, · · · ,k
′
R′
}
,k
′
r′ ∈ Fl+1p
to each node which each of these sets has R = R
′
= |Kni | =
∣∣∣K′ni∣∣∣ = 12(1−δ)eln(1/q) keys. In
addition, q is the security parameter and it stands as q = (N.(Nc))−1 [133], where N is the
total number of recipients (usually q = 10−3 would be sufficient) and c is a fixed number of
corrupted users. Every key kr or k
′
r′ is included in a set of each verifier with probability of
1/2(c+ 1) (for simplicity, we consider the same length for both poll keys).
5.3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the possibilities of an adversary launching pollution attack
successfully. Hence, three possible pollution attack behaviours are analysed, and their security
levels are quantified respectively. Finally, the possible knowledge that an adversary can access
is analysed.
1. Resistance Against Pollution Attack
We consider the following three possible pollution attack scenarios:
85
• 1st Pollution Behaviour: Data Pollution Attack
An adversary node intends to make changes in a message. This polluted message
can be detected immediately by the next hop; or in a few hops later (maximum
c − 1 hops later). It means the polluted message should travel some hops to be
detected. The worst case happens whenever an adversary can do coalition with the
other c− 1 compromised nodes.
• 2nd Pollution Behaviour: Tag (i.e., MAC) Pollution Attack
An adversary node intends to make changes in the MACs. This attack can be
detected immediately by the next hop if he cannot compromise the next hop and
get the next hop keys; or in a few hops later (maximum c − 1 hops later). It is
similar to the 1st pollution behaviour.
• 3rd Pollution Behaviour: Dual-Tag (i.e., D-MAC) Pollution Attack
An adversary i , which is one of the N legitimate nodes (N − i is the maximum
number of hops between the adversary and the sink node) intends to make changes
in D-MACs. This attack can be detected by the next hop by the probability of
1
2(c+1) . The polluted D-MAC can travel some hops, before it is detected, by the
probability of
[
1− 12(c+1)
]N−i
(see Theorem 6).
Theorem 6. The probability that a downstream user receives the same key as keyx
of user x is not less than
[
1− 12(c+1)
]N−i
.
Proof. The probability of recovering the same shared key between two nodes is
1
2(c+1) , so the probability of the keyx from a user x is located in next hop x + 1
is 12(c+1) , and this probability would be
(
1
2(c+1)
)2
if this key finds in two hops
later. In the other words, if the total number of hops between an intermediate
node and a sink node, named as downstream node, is N − i , then the probability
that a downstream user receives the same key as keyx of user x is not less than[
1− 12(c+1)
]N−i
.
2. The Possible Knowledge of an Adversary
As mentioned earlier, we assume the source node is trustworthy and the process of
key pre-distribution is secure. Hence, the secret key sets, KS and K′S , assigned to the
source node are considered secure. However, an adversary can wiretap all the data
communication in a network and may compromise several relay or sink nodes. Hence,
the adversary can get access to the received packets from the previous hops, the key
information distributed to him by the KDC and the key information stored at the
compromised nodes.
5.3.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, communication and computation overhead of the proposed Dual-HMAC
scheme are presented.
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5.3.5.1 Communication Overhead
In our scheme, each source message has m+ n codewords and each codeword has log2p
bits. So, the bit-length of a source message is (m+n)log2p. The L MACs and the L
′
D-MACs
are appended to the source message. We consider log2p symbols for each MAC and D-MAC.
By fixing L + L
′
= l , our scheme has the following communication overhead:
(L+ L
′
)log2p
(m+ n)log2p
=
L+ L
′
m+ n
=
l
m+ n
(5.10)
Hence, the Dual-HMAC scheme’s overhead is equal to the scheme presented in [25]. However
this scheme is vulnerable to tag pollution. Additionally, the bandwidth overhead between our
scheme and the scheme proposed in [3] is given by the following equation:
ObDual−HMAC
ObMacSig
=
l
m+n
l+1
m+n +
32l
128(m+n)
=
1
1.25 + 1l
(5.11)
Base on equation 5.11, the bandwidth overhead comparison between our scheme and the
scheme described in [3] , for different values of c, are depicted in the graphs in the following
Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 respectively.
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Figure 5.4: The bandwidth overhead comparison ( δ = 0.1, n = 20m,  = 0.01, and c = 1
in [3]).
5.3.5.2 Computation Overhead
Recall that to append L MACs and L
′
D-MACs, L(m+n+ 1) and L
′
(L+ 1) multiplication
operations for MACs and D-MACs are needed, respectively. In addition, for verification, we
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Figure 5.5: The bandwidth overhead comparison ( δ = 0.1, n = 20m,  = 0.01, and c = 2
in [3]).
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Figure 5.6: The bandwidth overhead comparison ( δ = 0.1, n = 20m,  = 0.01, and c = 3
in [3]).
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consider that all the relay nodes have shared keys and each node needs to verify the message.
So, as shown in equation 5.6 and 5.7, our scheme needs L(m+n+ 1) multiplications for MACs
and L
′
(L+ 1) multiplications for D-MACs.
5.3.6 Conclusion
This section has presented a homomorphic MAC-based scheme, called Dual-HMAC, for
network coding-enabled WNs. The proposed scheme makes use of two types of tags to provide
resistance against data pollution attacks and partially tag pollution attacks. Furthermore,
our proposed scheme presents low communication overhead and low computational overhead
compared to other existing schemes.
To conclude this section, consider the following.
• Dual-HMAC incurs a relatively low communication overhead which is almost equal
to [25]; however, our scheme’s overhead, according to 5.11, saves up to (1.25 + 1/l) in
comparing to MacSig approach [3]. This means that our scheme provides at least 25 %
bandwidth saving.
• Dual-HMAC not only slightly increases the tag pollution resistance, but also decreases
the computation overhead compared to the schemes in [3, 25].
• Dual-HMAC provides resistance for half of the tags against tag pollution attack. This
results in reducing the possibility of tag pollution around 50% compared to the work
presented in [25].
5.4 An Efficient Dual Homomorphic MAC Scheme
5.4.1 Proposed Homomorphic Message Authentication Code-based (HMAC)
scheme
Our proposed scheme makes use of two types of homomorphic MACs, called MACs and
D-MACs, and one homomorphic signature, called Sign, which are appended to the end of the
coded packet. Particularly, each MAC ensures integrity of the content of the coded packet
and each D-MAC ensures integrity of the MACs of the coded packet as it is also described in
the previous section (5.3). In addition to MACs and D-MACs, our proposed scheme leverages
a homomorphic signature to ensure integrity of D-MACs and achieve resistance against both
data pollution and tag pollution attacks.
Our proposed HMAC scheme consists of four steps, as it is depicted in Figure 5.7. In
step 1, the source generates the coded packets based on the native packets and by using the
equation 5.1. Then, in step 2, the required MACs and D-MACs as well as the required Sign
are created based on the equations 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 respectively. Afterwards, in step 3, the
intermediate nodes recode the received packets according to the equation 5.2. Finally, in step
4, the sink nodes decode the received packets and obtain the native packets.
The construction of our proposed scheme is based on the following four basic algorithms:
MAC, Sign, Combine, and Verify. The definitions of these algorithms as well as the construction
of HMAC are given below in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3, respectively. Finally, our proposed key
distribution model for HMAC is presented in section 5.4.4.
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Figure 5.7: The four main steps of HMAC scheme.
5.4.2 The basic algorithms of HMAC
In HMAC, the source node makes use of the MAC and Sign algorithms. Moreover, the
intermediate nodes perform the Combine and Verify algorithms, and the sink nodes perform
the Verify algorithm.
• MAC
Input:
Two sets of key vectors: {K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl},Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , and {K
′
1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l ′},K
′
i ∈ Fl+1p .
We consider l and l
′
as the number of MACs and D-MACs respectively.
Output: Two sets of tags: l MACs t1 , t2 , ..., tl ∈ Fp and l ′ D-MACs t ′1 , t
′
2 , ..., t
′
l ′ ∈ Fp.
• Sign
Input: Select a generator g from a multiplicative cyclic group G, and sample a pri-
vate key vector PrK = (β1 , β2 , ..., βl ′+1 ), where βi ∈ Fp, and compute a public key
PUK = (g
β1 , gβ2 , ..., g
β
l
′
+1 ).
Output: A signature (i.e., Sign ∈ Fp )
• Combine
Input: h random numbers from Fp and h vectors yi ∈ F m+np (1 ≤ i ≤ h). Each of
these vectors yi includes: a) l MACs tyi ,1 , tyi ,2 , ..., tyi ,l ∈ Fp(1 ≤ i ≤ h), b) l
′
D-MACs
t
′
yi ,1
, t
′
yi ,2
, ..., t
′
yi ,l
′ ∈ Fp(1 ≤ i ≤ h), and c) one signature Signyi ∈ Fp(1 ≤ i ≤ h).
Output: A vector Y ∈ Fm+n+l+l ′+1p .
• Verify
Input: Two subsets of key vectors of l and l
′
, the public key PUK , and Y ∈
Fm+n+l+l
′
+1
p .
Output: Either 1 (accept), or 0 (reject).
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5.4.3 The Construction of HMAC
• Setup.
The KDC distributes two sets of keys {K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl}, where Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , and
{K′1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l ′}, where K
′
i ∈ Fl+1p , as well as a private key PrK to the source node. More-
over, the KDC shares the public key and two subsets of Ki and K′j to each intermediate
and sink node where Ki ∈ K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl , and K′j ∈ K
′
1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l ′ .
• Tag Generation . Two sets of tags: l MACs t1 , t2 , ..., tl ∈ Fp and l ′ D-MACs
t
′
1 , t
′
2 , ..., t
′
l ′ ∈ Fp are calculated according to the following equations:
ti = −
m+n∑
j=1
Ki ,juj
Ki ,m+n+1 , (i = 1, ..., l) (5.12)
t
′
i′ = −
l∑
r=1
K′
i ′ ,r tr
K′
i ′ ,l+1
, (i
′
= 1, ..., l
′
) (5.13)
• Sign . Based on the private key and D-MACs, a signature is calculated as:
Sign = −
∑l′
i=1 βit
′
i
βl′+1
(5.14)
• Combine. h random numbers from Fp and h vectors yi ∈ F m+np (1 ≤ i ≤ h). Each of
these vectors yi includes l MACs, l
′
D-MACs, and the signature Signyi . Output is a
linear combination and presented as a vector Y ∈ Fm+n+l+l ′+1p .
• Verify. Based on the two vectors of keys Ki and K′j , as well as the public key PUK , an
intermediate or destination node checks the correctness of the received coded packets
according to the following equations:
δi = (
∑m+n
j=1
Ki ,jYi ,j ) +Ki ,m+n+1 ti i = 1, ..., l (5.15)
δ
′
i′ = (
∑l
j=1
K′
i ′ ,j ti ′ ,j ) +K
′
i ′ ,l+1 t
′
i′ i
′
= 1, ..., l
′
(5.16)
η = (
∏l′
i=1
gβi
t
′
i ). g
β
l
′
+1
Sign
(5.17)
If δi = 0, for at least one specific i, and δ
′
i = 0, for at least one specific i
′
, and η = 1,
then the output of the verification procedure is equal to 1 (i.e. the packet has passed
the verification).
On the other hand, the packet is discarded if any of the above equations are not satisfied.
We describe the verification procedure in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Verification Procedure
Input:
• A packet Y ∈ Fm+np ,
• A set of key vectors Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , where Ki ∈ K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl ,
• A set of key vectors K′j ∈ Fl+1p , where K
′
j ∈ K
′
1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l
′ ,
• public key PUK ,
• l MACs where ti ∈ Flp,
• l′ D-MACs where t′i ∈ Fl
′
p ,
• a signature Sign ∈ Fp
;
Output: 0 or 1 ; /* Either 1 (accept), or 0 (reject) */
;
main()
foreach node do
foreach MAC(i.e., ti) do
; /* Checking the correctness of the MACs */
count1 = 0;
foreach Ki do
if δi = (
∑m+n
j=1 Ki,jYi,j ) +Ki,m+n+1 tr = 0 then
count1 + +,;
break; ;
if count1 6= 0 then
break ;;
if count1 = 0 then
output = 0;;
exit; ;
else
foreach D-MAC (i.e., t
′
i) do
; /* Checking the correctness of the D-MACs */
count2 = 0;
foreach K′
i
′ do
if δ
′
i = (
∑l
j=1K
′
i,j ti,j ) +K
′
i,l+1 t
′
r = 0 then
count2 + +,;
break; ;
if count2 = 0 then
output = 0;;
exit; ;
else
; /* Checking the correctness of the signature */
if η = (
∏l′
i=1 g
βi
t
′
i ). g
β
l
′
+1
Sign
= 1 then
output = 1; ; /* accept and pass the packet to the next hop */
else
output = 0; ; /* (reject the packet) */
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5.4.4 The Key Distribution Model of HMAC
According to the key distribution model of HMAC, the KDC assigns to the source l key vec-
tors of the set {K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl},Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , and l
′
key vectors of the set {K′1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l ′},K
′
i ∈
Fl+1p . We calculate the l and l
′
based on the following formula:
l = l
′
= L/2 =
1
2(1− δ)e(c+ 1)ln(1/q) (5.18)
Where L is given by the following equation which is provided in [3]:
L = l + l
′
=
1
1− δ e(c+ 1) ln(1/q) (5.19)
δ and q are security parameters and c is the number of compromised nodes as they are
defined in [3].
Furthermore, according to our key distribution model, which is based on the cover free
set systems proposed in [25] and [133], two key vectors are distributed to each intermediate
node. The one key vector {K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl}, Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p is used for MAC verification, based
on Equation 5.15, and the other key vector {K′1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l ′}, K
′
i ∈ Fl+1p is used for D-MAC
verification, based on Equation 5.16. According to our key distribution model, when the key
assignment has been completed, resistance against c compromised nodes can be achieved. It
is worthwhile to mention that our key distribution model takes into consideration that the
number of keys at the source should be c times more than the number of the keys assigned to
each intermediate or sink node in order to provide resistance against c compromised nodes.
In addition, we have considered that each node, in our key distribution model, has only
one assigned key, since one key is enough to check the correctness of each coded packet and
also the number of keys that the compromised nodes can access is minimized.
5.4.5 Security Analysis of HMAC
In this section, the possibilities of an adversary lunching a data pollution attack or a tag
pollution attack successfully are discussed. We consider the source S sends m coded packets
in each generation and each coded packet includes l MACs, l
′
D-MACs, and one signature.
• Data Pollution The following Definition 1 gives the essence of data pollution attacks
in HMAC.
Definition 1. A corrupted packet (i.e.,X
′ ∈ Fm+np ) is called as a polluted packet if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. X
′
/∈ Span {U1, ...,Um}
2. If an adversary is able to satisfy the following equation for at least one key vector
of the set {K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl}, Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p :
(
∑m+n
j=1
Ki ,jX ′j ) +Ki ,m+n+1 ti = 0 i = 1, ..., l (5.20)
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5.4.5.1 The adversary injects a polluted packet X
′
The adversary aims to modify a legitimate packet in order to create a polluted packet X
′
with the same MACs, the D-MACs and signature which satisfy the following equations:
(
∑m+n
j=1
Ki ,jX ′j ) +Ki ,m+n+1 ti = 0 i = 1, ..., l (5.21)
(
∑l
j=1
K′
i ′ ,j tj ) +K
′
i ′ ,l+1 t
′
i′ = 0 i
′
= 1, ..., l
′
(5.22)
(
∏l′
i=1
βi
t
′
i). βl′+1
Sign = 1 (5.23)
However, without making any changes in the MACs, the D-MACs and the signature,
the adversary only needs to satisfy the equation 5.21 in order to lunch a data pollution
attack successfully.
Theorem 7. Without making any changes in the MACs, the D-MACs, and the signature,
the probability that the adversary can pass the verification of the polluted packet (i.e.,
X
′
) through the equation 5.21, is not greater than 1/p.
Proof. We assume that the adversary tries to create X
′
which can pass the equation 5.21.
For this reason, the adversary needs to change at least two symbols of the legitimate
packets’ content data to create a polluted one. By considering that the adversary does
not change the MACs, the D-MACs or the signature, he needs to change only one symbol
of the packet’s content data and find another one in order to satisfy the equation 5.21.
Thus, the probability that the polluted packet passes the verification is equal to find a
symbol from the finite field Fp. This probability is equal to 1/p.
Theorem 8. Without making any changes in the MACs, the D-MACs, and the signature,
and by considering that there are d neighbor nodes for the adversary, the probability that
the polluted packet (i.e., X
′
) can pass the verification of the neighbor nodes depends on
which keys they have and is not greater than 1/ld.
Proof. According to the Theorem 7, the polluted packet has passed the verification
through the equation 5.21, so that the probability that the next hops will consider the
polluted packet as a legitimate one depends on the keys that they have. Particularly,
the next hops will consider the polluted packet as a legitimate one only if they have
the same key with the compromised node. However, for d nodes, it happens with the
probability of 1/ld1.
1For instance, if we use the settings in [3], and consider δ = 0.1, c = 1, 2, and 3, where c is the number of
compromised nodes, this probability in case of only two nodes (the adversary and its neighbor) is not greater
than 0.005, 0.003 and 0.001, respectively.
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• Tag Pollution
The following Definitions 2 and 3 give the essence of tag (i.e. MAC and D-MAC)
pollution attacks in HMAC.
Definition 2. A corrupted MAC (i.e. T ∈ Flp) is called as a polluted MAC if the
following condition is satisfied:
1. If an adversary is able to satisfy the following equation for at least one key vector
of the set {K′1 ,K
′
2 , ...,K
′
l
′}, K′i ∈ Fl+1p :
(
∑l
j=1
K′
j ,i ′Tj ,i ′ ) +K
′
l+1 ,i ′ t
′
i′ = 0 i
′
= 1, ..., l
′
(5.24)
Definition 3. A corrupted D-MAC (i.e. T
′ ∈ Fl ′p ) is called as a polluted D-MAC if the
following condition is satisfied:
1. If an adversary is able to satisfy the following equation:
(
∏l′
i=1
βi
T
′
i ). βl′+1
Sign = 1 (5.25)
First of all, the adversary has to create a new signature (i.e. Sign
′
) for the packet in
which he intends to modify any of its MACs or D-MACs in order to create a polluted
packet that will pass the verification of equations 5.24 and 5.25.
Theorem 9. If the adversary modifies any of the MACs or the D-MACs of a packet
that he intends to pollute, the probability that the polluted packet will pass the verification
through the equation 5.25 is similar to the probability of solving a Discrete Logarithm
Problem, which is negligible.
Proof. We assume that the adversary has to calculate a new signature Sign
′
, which
can satisfy the equation 5.25, for the polluted MACs and D-MACs. For this reason,
the adversary derives Sign
′
from the equation 5.25. It is similar to solve a Discrete
Logarithm Problem, and the probability of success is equal to
1
p
=
1
28
, which is negligible,
because HMAC is defined over the finite field Fp with p = 28.
Theorem 10. If the adversary modifies the signature of a packet that he intends to
pollute, the probability of the polluted packet to pass the verification through the Equation
5.14, on the next node, is 0.
Proof. According to our key distribution model, described in Section 5.4.4, KDC dis-
tributes the public key PUK = (g
β1 , gβ2 , ..., g
β
l
′
+1 ) to all nodes. Thus, if the adversary
modifies the signature (i.e., sign’), the probability that the next node will not verify,
based on Equation 5.14, the modified signature is 0, since it holds the public key
PUK = (g
β1 , gβ2 , ..., g
β
l
′
+1 ).
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Then, the adversary, who has already verified the polluted packet, intends to pass the
verification of the neighbor nodes. However, it can be achieved when the adversary
and the neighbor nodes have the same key vectors (i.e. one key vector for verifying the
MACs and one key vector for verifying the D-MACs).
Theorem 11. The probability that the adversary has the same key vectors with d neighbor
nodes is not greater than
1
(l ∗ l ′)d .
Proof. According to our key distribution model, KDC assigns one set of l key vectors
for MAC verification and one set of l
′
key vectors for D-MAC verification to each node.
Thus, the probability that d nodes have the same set of keys with the adversary is almost
1
(l ∗ l ′)d , where l = l
′
=L2 .
5.4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the performance of our proposed HMAC scheme in terms of
computational complexity, communication overhead, and key storage overhead. We follow the
settings defined in [3] and thus we set p = 28, n = 1024, and m = 32. We compare HMAC
with the MacSig scheme, presented in [3], which is the most well-known tag pollution immune
scheme taking advantage of homomorphic MACs and one signature.
5.4.6.1 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of HMAC is considered for the source and non-source nodes
(i.e. intermediate and sink nodes). For the source node, we calculate the complexity of tags’
generation (i.e., MACs and D-MACs) and signatures’ generation. For the other nodes, we
calculate the time complexity of the verification algorithm of HMAC.
• At source node:
The number of MACs and D-MACs which are created at the source node is equal to
L = l + l
′
, where l is the number of MACs and l
′
is the number of D-MACs. However,
the source node has to calculate m+ n+ 1 and l + 1 multiplications for generating each
MAC and D-MAC, respectively. Moreover, the source node has to calculate a signature
which requires l
′
+ 1 multiplications to be generated.
• At Non-source nodes:
At each node, the following multiplications and exponentiations are required for verifica-
tion of a packet: a) l ∗ (m + n + 1 ) multiplications for MAC verification, b) l ′ ∗ (l + 1 )
multiplications for D-MAC verification, and c) l
′
+ 1 exponentiations for signature
verification.
In terms of exponentiations, we have considered that each exponentiation is equivalent to
3
2 |p| multiplications as it is shown in [3]. Figure 5.8 represents the number of multiplications
which are required for verification of a packet at each non-source node for three different
numbers of compromised nodes (i.e. c = 1, 2 and 3). Our demonstration shows the efficiency
of HMAC compared to MacSig scheme which is proposed in [3]. HMAC is almost 10 times
faster than it.
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Figure 5.8: The number of multiplications required for verification of a coded packet at each
non-source node for three different numbers of compromised nodes.
5.4.7 Communication Overhead
To calculate the communication overhead of HMAC, we take into consideration the number
of symbols of the MACs, the D-MACs and the signature appended to the end of each coded
packet. The total number of symbols of the MACs and the D-MACs is given by the equation
5.19. However, the signature adds one more symbol and thus the total number of symbols of
each coded packet is given by the following equation:
Tsymbols =
1
1− δ e(c+ 1) ln(q) + 1 (5.26)
In other words, the communication overhead of HMAC is Tsymbols ∗ dlog2 pe bits.
Compared to MacSig scheme in [3], HMAC achieves 25% less communication overhead.
Our key distribution model allows HMAC to achieve this considerable gain in terms of
communication overhead. Finally, we depict the HMAC communication overhead in Figure
5.9.
5.4.8 Key storage Overhead
The source node needs to store the l key vectors for generating the MACs and the l
′
key
vectors for generating the D-MACs of each coded packet. The size of each key vector for
generating the MACs is m+ n+ 1 and the size of each key vector for generating the D-MACs
is l + 1. Also the source node has to store the private key vector, with size l
′
+ 1, for generating
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Figure 5.9: HMAC communication overhead per coded packet.
the signature of each coded packet. Thus, the total key storage size (in bits) required at the
source node is given by the following equation:
TSource = {l ∗ (m + n + 1 ) + l ′ ∗ (l + 1 ) + l ′ + 1)} ∗ dlog2 pe (5.27)
Furthermore, each of the intermediate and sink node has to store one key vector for
verifying the corresponding MAC, one key vector for verifying the corresponding D-MAC, and
the public key for verifying the signature of each coded packet. Hence, the total key storage
size (in bits) required at each intermediate and sink node is given by the following equation:
TNon−Source = {(m + n + 1 ) + (l + 1 ) + l ′ + 1)} ∗ dlog2 pe (5.28)
Compared to MacSig scheme in [3], HMAC achieves almost 50% less key storage overhead
at the source node. In addition, HMAC achieves a significant gain (200 to 400 times), compared
to MacSig scheme, in terms of the total key storage size required at each non-source node.
Figure 5.10 shows the total key storage size required by HMAC at the source node compared
to MacSig. Moreover, Figure 5.11 shows the total key storage size required by HMAC, at each
non-source node, compared to MacSig.
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Figure 5.10: The total key storage size at the source for HMAC and MacSig in terms of the
number of tags (i.e. MACs, D-MACs, and signature).
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Figure 5.11: The total key storage size at a non-source for HMAC and MacSig in terms of the
number of tags (i.e. MACs, D-MACs, and signature).
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5.4.9 Conclusion
In this section, an efficient homomorphic MAC-based scheme, called HMAC, has been
proposed to provide resistance against data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks by
using three types of homomorphic tags (i.e. MACs, D-MACs, and one signature) which are
appended to the end of the coded packet.
The performance evaluation of HMAC shows that it is more efficient in terms of complexity,
communication overhead and key storage overhead, compared to the MacSig scheme, which is
the most well-known tag pollution immune scheme taking advantage of homomorphic MACs
and signature. Particularly, HMAC has a verification process almost 10 times faster than
MacSig, and achieves 25% less communication overhead than MacSig. Finally, HMAC achieves
almost 50% less key storage overhead at the source node and a significant gain, in terms of
the key storage overhead at each non-source node, compared to the MacSig scheme.
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Part II
Null Space-based Homomorphic
MAC
101
5.5 A Null Space-based Homomorphic MAC Scheme
5.5.1 Introduction
To detect both data and tag pollution attacks in an efficient way, in this Section, we
propose an efficient null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme for RLNC-enabled wireless
networks. According to our scheme, the source generates multiple MACs (tags) and D-MACs
for each message packet. The former one ensures the integrity of the packet and the latter one
ensures the integrity of the MACs. We show that our scheme can resist against data and tag
pollution attacks.
The rest of the Section is outlined as follows. In Section 5.5.2, the outline of the proposed
scheme is discussed. Then in Section 5.5.3 and Section 5.5.4, we describe the construction and
correctness of the proposed scheme, respectively. Furthermore, in Section 5.5.5 the security
analysis of the proposed scheme is given. Our performance evaluation takes place in Section
5.5.6. Finally, Section 5.5.7 concludes the Section.
5.5.2 Outline
To generate the required MACs and D-MACs, our scheme consists of three steps. In step
1, it computes the l MACs (i.e., tags) for each message according to the keys which are chosen
randomly from a set of secret keys KS . Then, in step 2, our scheme computes a number
of D-MACs (i.e., tags of tags), which should satisfy an orthogonality property of the initial
MACs calculated in step 1, and it is calculated by using the properties of Null keys which
was defined in the previous section. Finally, in step 3, the computed MACs and D-MACs are
appended to the message. These three steps are depicted in Figure 5.12.
5.5.3 Construction
This scheme includes four steps: Setup, Tag Generation, Verification and Encoding detailed
as follows:
1. Setup:
• Key Distribution Centre (KDC) distributes the following set of secret keys (i.e.,
key vectors) to the source node S :
KS = {k1,k2, · · · ,kl} ,ki ∈ Fm+n+1p (5.29)
• KDC also distributes the following subsets of secret vectors to all intermediate
nodes and sink nodes:
Kni = {k1, · · · ,kR} , kr ∈ Fm+n+1p (5.30)
2. Tag generation
For every data packet ui ∈ Fm+np of each generation consisting of m data packets,
the source uses the equations 5.31 and 5.32 to generate the l MACs and l
′
D-MACs,
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Figure 5.12: Our proposed scheme description. In the first step, we make l MACs (i.e., tags)
by choosing l sets of keys from pool keys. Next, in step 2, we use the same keys to generate l
′
D-MACs (we use l
′
of l keys which is used for the first step). Finally, in step 3, we append
these l MACS and l
′
D-MACs at the end of message packet.
respectively:
tui,l = −
m+n∑
j=1
ui,j × kl,j
kl,m+n+1
(5.31)
k1,1 . . . k1,l... . . . ...
kl′,1 · · · kl′,l
 ( t1...
tl
)
+
k1,(l+1) . . . k1,(l+l′)... . . . ...
kl′,(l+1) · · · kl,(l+l′)
 ( t′1...
t′l′
)
= o(l′×1) (5.32)
3. Verification:
When a relay or sink node receives a coded packety ∈ Fm+np with its tags, this node
checks the correctness of packet y using the algorithm Verify via its pre-distributed keys
Kni . If the results of following equations are 0, the received coded packet y is correct
and the output is 1; otherwise the output is 0 and then this packet is discarded.
δr =
m+n∑
j=1
yj kr,j
+ ty,r k r, m+n+1 = 0, ∀ kr ∈ {k1, · · · ,kR} (5.33)
δ
′
r =
 l∑
j=1
ty,j kr,j
+
 l′∑
j=L+1
t′y,j kr,j
 = 0, ∀ kr ∈ {k1, · · · ,kR} (5.34)
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4. Encoding: When an intermediate node receives h encoded packets ui ∈ Fm+np (1 ≤ i ≤ h),
and they all are checked or considered to be correct, a forward coded packet along with
new tags is generated using the following algorithm with locally randomly generated
coefficients ci:
combine
((
ui, tui,1, · · · tui,L, t
′
ui,1, · · · , t
′
ui,L′
)h
i=1
, (ci)
h
i=1
)
(5.35)
5.5.4 The Correctness of proposed scheme
Our proposed scheme is correct if the Verify algorithm passed the verification by getting 1
for the output of the two following algorithms. Our first algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 3) provides
resistant against pollution attack; and the second one (i.e., Algorithm 4) takes care of tag
pollution attacks. The Algorithm 4 is run whenever Algorithm 3 is given 1 as the result;
otherwise the native packet is discarded.
Theorem 12. Algorithm 3 is correct.
Proof. According to the description of “Setup”, there is a key kl = kr for l = r.
As a result, by letting y = ui,kl = kr, and substituting ty,r = tui,l using Equation 5.31,
then for sure, according to Equation 5.33, we have that: δr = 0,∀kr ∈ Kni .
As a result, the Algorithm 3 is correct:
V erify (Kni , (ui, MAC(KS ,ui))) = 1 (5.36)
Theorem 13. Algorithm 4 is correct.
Proof. According to Equation 5.32, the D-MACs are created in a way that kl is orthogonal to
the concatenation of tui,j and t
′
ui,r where (j=1, ..., l), (r=1, ..., l
′). It can be represented
as: kui,i⊥(tui,j ‖ t′ui,r). This relationship is true for all packets in the same generation. We
assume that an adversary modifies d tags (i.e., ti or t
′
j), so regarding the Equation 5.32, if we
assigned only one key vector to each node, the possibility of getting the result 1 is equal to 1
pd
and it is very small (i.e., if Fp = F28 and d = 2, this probability should be 1216 ≈ 0.001%.).
However, according to the key distribution model, we assign more than one vector keys, and
it means that modifying any tags would be impossible and it will be detected immediately.
Thus, the probability of a packet with modified tags passing the verification at two nodes is
small and the second Algorithm is also correct.
5.5.5 Security analysis
We assume the source node is trustworthy and the process of key pre-distribution is secure.
Hence, the secret key sets kS , assigned to the source node are considered secure. However, an
adversary can wiretap all the data communication in a network and may compromise several
relay or sink nodes. Hence, the adversary can get access to the received packets from the
previous hops, the key information distributed to him by the KDC and the key information
stored at the compromised nodes. We consider three types of attacks as the following:
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Algorithm 3: Verification Procedure for data integrity
Input:
• A packet Y ∈ Fm+np ,
• A set of key vectors Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , where Ki ∈ K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl ,
• l MACs where ti ∈ Flp,
• count = 0
;
Output: 0 or 1 ; /* Either 1 (accept), or 0 (reject) */
;
main()
foreach Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p do
if V erify (Kni , (ui, MAC(KS ,ui))) = 1 then
count+ +;
else
continue;
if count > 0 then
output = 1;
; /* (call algorithm 4) */
exit; ;
else
output = 0; ; /* (reject the packet) */
Algorithm 4: Verification Procedure for tag integrity
Input:
• A packet Y ∈ Fm+np ,
• A set of key vectors Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p , where Ki ∈ K1 ,K2 , ...,Kl ,
• l MACs where ti ∈ Flp,
• count = 0
;
Output: 0 or 1 ; /* Either 1 (accept), or 0 (reject) */
;
main()
foreach Ki ∈ Fm+n+1p do
if V erify (Kni , (MAC(KS ,ui), D −MAC(KS ,ui))) = 1 then
count+ +;
else
continue;
if count > 0 then
output = 1;
; /* (Accept the packet */
exit; ;
else
output = 0; ; /* (reject the packet) */
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1. Data Pollution attack:
If an adversary makes any change in the native packet, it is detected immediately;
however, there is a possibility to travel more hops if these hops don’t have the key. This
probability is negligible.
2. Tag Pollution attack (i.e., MACs):
By checking the result of Algorithm 4, if an adversary makes any change in any tags, it
is detected immediately.
3. Tag Pollution attack (i.e., D-MACs):
Regarding the tags (i.e., D-MACs) which are based on Null space properties and
calculated by source node, there is no possibility to alter these tags.
5.5.6 Performance evaluation
In this section we provide a communication and computational complexity comparison
of our proposed scheme and the two related works which can resist against tag pollution
attacks [3], [4].
5.5.6.1 Communication Overhead
In [3], the MacSig scheme generates L MACs and a signature. This scheme uses a variable
number of MACs which is calculated by L = 1δ−1e(c + 1) ln
1
q , where δ and q are security
parameters, and c is the number of compromised nodes. Their idea relies on calculating L
MACs and a signature by a source node. Totally, L + 1 tags are appended at the end of each
native packet. An intermediate node or sink node should verify each received packet by using
the verification algorithm. We set the number MACs equal to l where this value is less than
the number of MACs which is used in [3] (i.e., L). Moreover, we consider the value of l
′
as
the number of D-MACs, where this value can be less or equal to l . In other word, the total
number of tags which be used in our proposed scheme is l + l′ < L.
However, the idea of [4] is based on generating tags and appending these tags to each
native packet. According to their consideration, this value is somehow equal to L. To end this
section, our proposed scheme provides a less communication overhead in comparing to the
related works.
5.5.6.2 Computational Complexity
For providing L MACs and a signature at a source node, MacSig [3] needs to use L(m+n+1)
and (m+ L+ 1) multiplications, respectively. However, for verification phase, it needs to do
multiplications and exponentiations, where according to their setup parameters; it should be
equal to 32 |p| (m+ L+ 1) + (m+ n+ 1)L multiplications totally. However, KEPTE [4] needs
to calculate N(m+ n) multiplications.
In our proposed scheme, we need to generate l + l′ tags. So, a source node needs to do
l(m+ n+ 1) + l′(l′ + l) multiplications. However, each node needs to verify a received packet
by calculating l(m+ n+ 1) + (l′ + l) multiplications. For more detail, see Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Computational Complexity. L and N are the total number of tags which is used
in [3] and [4], respectively.
At the source node At each intermediate or sink node
MacSig [3] (m+ n+ 1)L+ (m+ L+ 1) 32 |p| (m+ L+ 1) + (m+ n+ 1)L
KEPTE [4] N(m+ n) N(m+ n)
Our proposed Scheme l(m+ n+ 1) + l′(l′ + l) l(m+ n+ 1) + (l′ + l)
5.5.7 Conclusion
In this section, a lightweight encryption scheme on top of network coding, to further
to provide resistance against data pollution and tag pollution attacks by using two types
of tags (i.e., MACs and D-MACs) was presented. We showed that our proposed scheme
is efficient in computation, and incurs less communication overhead and keys storage for
encryptions/decryptions.
5.6 An Efficient Null Space-based Homomorphic MAC Scheme
5.6.1 Introduction
In this Section, we propose an efficient homomorphic MAC scheme, where each tag has
not a fixed location in the coded packet, providing resistance against tag pollution attacks. In
the proposed scheme, the tags are calculated based on null space properties and then, they
are secretly swapped with the packet data [17]. Hence, they are not appended to the end
of the coded packet and thus, an adversary is not able to distinguish them from the packet
data. Our results show that the proposed scheme is more efficient compared to the schemes
proposed in [3] and [4], in terms of computational complexity without incurring additional
communication overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed schemes in [3] and [4] are
the most competitive schemes in the literature for providing resistance against tag pollution
attacks in RLNC.
The rest of the Section is outlined as follows. In Section 5.6.2, the RLNC model is presented.
Then in Section 5.6.4, the proposed efficient null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme is
described. Furthermore, in Section 5.6.5 the security analysis of the proposed scheme is given.
Our performance evaluation takes place in Section 5.6.6. Finally, Section 5.6.7 concludes the
Section.
5.6.2 RLNC Model
Similarly to the Section 5.3, at the setup phase, the source divides each message into a
sequence of native packets and partitions them into generations. Thus, we consider that each
generation consists of m native packets denoted as u1,u2, ...,um. Each native packet ui, for
1 ≤ i ≤ m, is represented as a vector u1, u2, ..., un in the finite field Fnp , where p = 28 and it
denotes the size of the finite field. Then, the source S generates a coded packet ui for each
native packet ui by prefixing ui with the i
th unit vector of dimension m. The coded packet is
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reintroduced and represented as a row vector in the finite field Fm+np as follows:
ui = (
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0, ui,1, · · · , ui,n) ∈ Fm+np (5.37)
For simplicity, Equation 5.37 can also be written as follows:
ui = (ui,1, · · · , ui,m+n) ∈ Fm+np (5.38)
After that, the source S transmits the coded packets to its neighbor nodes. Each intermediate
node buffers its received packets ui temporarily and creates a coded packet y, which is a linear
combination of a number of h coded packets u1,u2, ...,uh belonging to the same generation.
A coded packet is represented as follows:
y =
h∑
i=1
αiui (5.39)
where αi is randomly selected from Fp, and all the arithmetic operations are done over the
finite field Fp. A coded packet y is considered to be valid if it is in the linear subspace spanned
by the coded packets generated at the source. This is denoted as y ∈ span {u1, · · · ,um}. In
fact, when y is valid, the linear combination coefficients are the first m symbols of the packet y.
Otherwise, y is invalid and it is denoted as y /∈ span {u1, · · · ,um}, which may be caused due
to transmission errors or pollution attacks. At the destination, when a sink node obtains m
linearly independent coded packets, it can decode them by using Gaussian eliminations [18].
5.6.3 Adversary Model
In our adversary model, the adversary aims to corrupt (i.e., pollute) tags of coded packets
belonging to the same generation, so that coded packets with legitimate content will be
discarded later from next intermediate nodes due to the corrupted tags. It is possible for
a coded packet with legitimate content and corrupted tags to travel multiple hops if the
intermediate nodes hold the same keys with the adversary or they do not hold those keys that
can verify the coded packet and detect the corrupted tags. Otherwise, if the next intermediate
nodes hold the keys that verify the coded packet, then the corrupted tags will be detected
immediately and the coded packet will be discarded. Moreover, we assume the source node
and the destination nodes are trustworthy and secure. Finally, the process of key distribution
is considered secure.
5.6.4 An Efficient Null Space-based homomorphic MAC Scheme
5.6.4.1 Construction
The proposed homomorphic MAC scheme is based on null space properties [115] for tag
generation and verification. The proposed scheme consists of the following five steps:
1. Key Distribution to Source Node
A Key Distribution Center (KDC) distributes L key vectors K1,K2, ...,KL to the source
node. Each of them is represented in the finite field Fm+n+Lp .
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Figure 5.13: Swapping process in the proposed null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme.
2. Tag generation
The source node S uses the L key vectors K1,K2, ...,KL to produce L tags for each
coded packet consisting of m+ n symbols. These L tags (t1, t2, ..., tL, where ti ∈ Fp) are
calculated according to the following formula:K1,1 ... K1,m+n... ... ...
KL,1 ... KL,m+n

L∗(m+n)
∗

ui,1
ui,2
:
ui,m+n

(m+n)∗1
+
K1,m+n+1 ... K1,m+n+L: : :
KL,m+n+1 ... KL,m+n+L

L∗L
∗

t1
t2
...
tL

L∗1
= 0
(5.40)
Afterwards, the source node appends the L calculated tags to the end of the coded
packet ui, which is created by prefixing the native packet ui with m coefficients, as it is
shown in Fig 5.13.
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3. Swapping
To avoid tag pollution attacks, the L tag symbols of the coded packet ui are swapped
with only L out of the n symbols of the coded packet ui. It is worthwhile to mention
that the coefficients of the coded packet do not participate in the swapping process so
that the destination nodes can decode correctly. Particularly, the swapping process is
based on a secret value SV (i.e., positive integer) that plays the role of the swapping
vector. This secret value is generated randomly by the KDC through a pseudorandom
function, and it is known to the source node and all the destination nodes. However, it
is unknown to the intermediate nodes. The result of this swapping process is a swapped
coded packet ui, where the L tags symbols are mixed with the n symbols of the coded
packet ui, as it is shown in Fig 5.13, where SV = 2. Each swapped coded packet is
represented as follows:
ui = Swap(ui)SV (5.41)
On the other hand, at the destination nodes, an inverse swapping is required, before
RLNC-decoding, to obtain the native packet.
4. Key Distribution to Intermediate and Destination Nodes
Based on the swapping vector SV , the KDC creates new key vectors K′1,K′2, ...,K′L
by swapping accordingly the symbols of each key vectors K1,K2, ...,KL, which have
been used by the source node for tag generation. Each new key vector is represented as
follows:
K′i = Swap(Ki)SV (5.42)
The KDC of our scheme adopts a key distribution model, based on the cover free set
systems [25,133], in order to provide resistance against c compromised nodes. In this
model, the maximum number of key vectors that should be assigned to each intermediate
and destination node cannot be more than R = e ∗ (c+ 1) ∗ ln(1/q), where q is a security
parameter (usually q = 10−3). In our proposed scheme, this assumption is satisfied
since only one key vector is required to be assigned by the KDC to each intermediate
and destination node. This is why each key vector is orthogonal to the swapped coded
packet, and thus the intermediate and destination nodes require only one key vector to
verify the swapped coded packet.
5. Verification
Given that each intermediate and destination node holds a key vector, K′i, they verify a
swapped coded packet ui based on the following formula:
δ = Swap(Ki)SV ∗ Swap(ui)SV =
m+n+L∑
j=1
K′i,j ∗ ui,j (5.43)
If δ = 0, then the swapped coded packet ui is accepted and transmitted to the next
nodes. Otherwise, it is discarded.
5.6.4.2 Correctness
Theorem 14. (Correctness) The proposed scheme is correct.
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Proof. (Poof by Contradiction) We assume to the contrary that the proposed scheme is not
correct. If this is the case, from Equation 5.43 we have that δ 6= 0. We consider a coded packet
xi = (xi1, ..., x
i
m+n) and L key vectors K = (K1, ...,KL), to generate L tags ti = (ti1, ..., tiL)
based on Equation 5.40. According to Equation 5.43 and by considering SV = 1, we have the
following:
Swap(K)SV ∗ Swap(xiT )SV =
 K1,1...K1,m+n+1...K1,m+n+L K1,m+1...K1,m+L...
KL,1...KL,m+n+1...KL,m+n+L KL,m+1...KL,m+L
 ∗
[
xi1 ... t
i
1 ... t
i
L ... x
i
m+n x
i
m+1 ... x
i
m+L
]T (5.44)
=
K1,1 ∗ x
i
1 + ...K1,m+n+L ∗ tiL
...
KL,1 ∗ xi1 + ...KL,m+n+L ∗ tiL

L∗1
(5.45)
However, the vector xi = [xi1, ..., x
i
m+n, t
i
1, ..., t
i
L] is orthogonal to each of the L key vectors
according to Equation 5.40. Thus, we have the following:
K ∗ xiT =
K1,1 ... K1,m+n+L... ... ...
KL,1 ... KL,m+n+L
 ∗

xi1
xi2
...
tiL

=
K1,1 ∗ x
i
1 + ...K1,m+n+L ∗ tiL
...
KL,1 ∗ xi1 + ...KL,m+n+L ∗ tiL

L∗1
=

0
0
...
0

L∗1
(5.46)
From Equations 5.45 and 5.46, it is obvious that δ = 0. However, this contradicts the
original assumption that δ 6= 0. Thus, the proposed construction is correct. According to the
inductive reasoning, it can also be proved that the proposed scheme is correct for each SV
(1 ≤ SV ≤ n).
5.6.5 Security Analysis
We consider that an adversary can wiretap all the swapped coded packets (i.e., ui) of the
network and obtain the key vector K′i of each compromised node. In this section, we firstly
calculate the probability of the adversary to guess the swapping vector SV of the source and
then, we calculate the probability of the adversary to launch a tag pollution attack.
• Probability of Guessing the Swapping Vector SV
SV cannot be obtained from compromised intermediate nodes, since it is known only to
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the source node and the destination nodes which are considered trustworthy and secure.
Also, SV cannot be derived from the transmitted swapped coded packets ui because
they are already swapped and RLNC-encoded. Thus, the adversary can only take a
random guess, which has a probability of
1
n
to be correct. Moreover, the adversary is
not able to confirm whether the random guess is correct or not.
• Probability of Launching a Tag Pollution Attack
To launch a tag pollution attack, an adversary has to corrupt a swapped coded packet
and send it to a neighbor node, where it should pass the verification step. According to
Equation 5.43, the corrupted packet will pass the verification in a neighbor node, if this
node keeps the same key vector with the adversary. Otherwise, the corrupted packet
will be detected and discarded by the neighbor node. According to our key distribution
model, each intermediate and destination node is assigned only one key vector out of
the L source key vectors. Thus, in the case that the adversary has only one neighbor
node, the probability that the adversary has the same key with its neighbor node is not
greater than 1/L. In other words, in this case, the probability that the adversary can
launch a tag pollution attack is not greater than 1/L. However, according to the RLNC
model that we have considered for the proposed scheme, the case that the adversary
has only one neighbor node is not possible at all. Indeed, it is only a theoretical case
that we take into consideration for the sake of completeness. On the other hand, in the
case that the adversary has d neighbor nodes, the probability that the adversary has the
same key vector with one of its d neighbor nodes is not greater than 1/Ld. Consequently,
the probability of launching a tag pollution attack in this case is not greater than 1/Ld,
which is negligible. As a result the corrupted packet will be detected immediately. This
case is realistic according to the RLNC model considered for the proposed scheme.
5.6.6 Performance Evaluation
We analyze the performance of our proposed null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme
in terms of computational complexity and communication overhead. We follow the settings
defined in [3] and thus, we set p = 28, n = 1024, and m = 32. We compare our proposed scheme
with MacSig [3] and KEPTE [4] which are the most competitive schemes in the literature for
providing resistance against tag pollution attacks in RLNC.
5.6.6.1 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of our proposed null space-based homomorphic MAC
scheme is considered for the source and non-source nodes. For the source node, we calculate
the complexity of tag generation. For non-source nodes, we calculate the complexity of the
verification step.
At source node: The number of tags which is generated at the source node is equal
to L. According to Equation 5.40, L ∗ (m + n + L) finite field multiplications are required
for generating the L tags. From Figure 5.14, we observe that our proposed scheme requires
almost the same number of multiplications for tag generation as both the MacSig and KEPTE
schemes.
At Non-source nodes: According to Equation 5.43, the verification step requires
m+ n+L finite field multiplications. From Figure 5.15, we observe that our proposed scheme
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Figure 5.14: The number of multiplications required for tag generation at the source node.
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Figure 5.15: The number of multiplications required for tag verification at each non-source
node.
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requires much less number of multiplications for tag verification compared to both the MacSig
and KEPTE schemes.
5.6.6.2 Communication Overhead
To calculate the communication overhead of our proposed scheme, we take into consideration
the number of the tags appended to the end of each coded packet. However, each tag is one
symbol of the finite field Fnp , where p = 28, and the total number of tags is L = 11−δ e(c+1) ln(
1
q ),
as it is shown in [3]. Consequently, the communication overhead of our proposed scheme is
L ∗ dlog2 pe bits per packet. Moreover, for the three different values of L given in [3] (i.e.
L = 27, 42 and 54), our proposed scheme incurs 2% to 5% communication overhead, which is
similar to the one incurred by the KEPTE scheme [4], but half of the communication overhead
incurred by the MacSig scheme (i.e., 5% to 10%) [3].
5.6.7 Conclusion
In this Section, we have proposed a null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme providing
resistance against tag pollution attacks in RLNC. The performance evaluation of our scheme
shows that it is more efficient compared to the MacSig and KEPTE schemes, which are the
most competitive tag pollution immune schemes, in terms of computational complexity without
incurring additional communication overhead.
5.7 Conclusion
NC-enabled wireless networks are vulnerable to pollution attacks where a malicious node
injects into the network corrupted packets that prevent the destination nodes from decoding
correctly. In this chapter, four schemes have been proposed to provide resistance against data
and pollution attacks. The first two scheme, called Dual-HMAC and HMAC respectively,
are based on inner multiplication and orthogonality of a native packet and key vector. Both
schemes make use of two types of MACs (tags). However, in HMAC scheme, we append a
signature, as well as the two tags, to provide resistance against tag pollution attacks. In the
third and fourth schemes, the tags are created according to the null space properties. Our last
scheme, called an efficient null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme also swaps the tags into
the data packet. Thus, lunching a tag pollution attack in this scheme is meaningless. Moreover,
our results have shown that our proposed schemes can benefit from a low computational
complexity, key storage and bandwidth overheads.
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Chapter 6
Main Contributions and Future
Work
”To achieve great things, two things are
needed; a plan, and not quite enough
time.”
Leonard Bernstein
In this thesis, motivated by the recent surge in network coding research and its applications,
we have considered wireless communication networks which allow for network coding operations,
i.e., the relay nodes perform XOR or linear NC. However, the advent of NC paradigm opens
new challenges in terms of security aspects. During the thesis, we have mainly focused
on pollution attacks that arise in this context. Moreover, our goal in this thesis was to
propose some lightweight secure schemes that are resistance against pollution attacks. We
showed (via qualitative comparisons) that the proposed schemes are not only very simple
and lightweight when it comes to the computational complexity, but also they are highly
bandwidth communication and storage efficient. We now present an overview of the original
main contributions of this dissertation.
6.1 Summary of the Thesis
We have studied the general problem of how to secure a typical wireless network that
uses network coding as its routing policy. In a very broad sense, we categorized the security
threats and attacks in wireless networks into two main classes such as: active attacks and
passive attacks. The main difference between these two attack types is that in active attacks
(which are also known as pollution attacks or Byzantine attacks) the attacker tries to breach
the integrity of the data, while in passive attacks (also known as eavesdropping attacks or
wiretapping attacks) the confidentiality of the data is targeted and threatened.
• The emerging Wireless Networks (WNs) are a promising technology that can contribute
significantly towards the improvement of safety, convenience and comfort in the daily
life of modern societies. However, WNs are characterized by limitations that can affect
the advancement of using WNs. These limitations are related to low communication
bandwidth, packet loss and power consumption. Therefore, it is obvious that the success
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and prosperity of WNs are dependent on advances of WNs in these limitations. Towards
this direction, the application of NC technology in WNs, leading to NC-enabled WNs,
can be a promising solution. Recent research efforts show that NC technology can
provide significant benefits to WNs in terms of improvement in network capacity and
robustness among others. However, due to the fact that NC technology enables the
intermediate nodes to manipulate and mix incoming data packets from neighboring
nodes as well as to transmit data packets between them, security issues are raised in
NC-enabled WNs. Additionally, these security issues can be exploited by attackers to
compromise the security of the WNs, which is a critical factor for their success. Therefore,
in Chapter 3, we have focused on the current existing NC-enabled WNs attacks that
can have a negative impact on security of the whole wireless networks. Furthermore, we
have presented the current mitigation techniques, derived from the literature, against
the most common attacks identified here. In addition, our objective was to propose a
framework for positioning our research proposals towards the design and deployment of
more reliable and efficient defense mechanisms against known attacks for NC-enabled
WNs.
• In Chapter 4, we have proposed an efficient Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based
scheme providing resistance against pollution attacks in XOR NC-enabled WNs. Our
proposed scheme makes use of a number of MACs which are appended to the end of each
native packet. Our results show that the proposed MAC-based scheme is more efficient
compared to the scheme proposed in [2], in terms of communication bandwidth and
computational complexity. The proposed scheme in [2] is the most competitive scheme
in the literature for securing XOR NC against pollution attacks in resource-constrained
wireless networks. Particularly, our scheme saves communication bandwidth, since it
detects corrupted packets in the next hop with high probability, and its computational
complexity is lower because it requires less XOR operations than the scheme proposed
in [2]. More precisely, we observe that verification process in our proposed scheme is
almost 5 to 10 times (l times) faster than [2].
• In Chapter 5, we presented our work into two parts.
– In the first part, we proposed two schemes, called a dual homomorphic Message
Authentication Code scheme and an efficient homomorphic Message Authentication
Code scheme respectively. The first proposed scheme makes use of two types of
tags to provide resistance against data pollution attacks and partially tag pollution
attacks. Furthermore, our proposed scheme presents low communication overhead
and low computational overhead compared to other existing schemes. In the
second proposed scheme (i.e., an efficient homomorphic Message Authentication
Code scheme), we have provided resistance against data pollution attacks and tag
pollution attacks by using three types of homomorphic tags (i.e. MACs, D-MACs,
and one signature) which are appended to the end of the coded packet. The
performance evaluation of our proposed scheme shows that it is more efficient in
terms of complexity, communication overhead and key storage overhead, compared
to the MacSig [3] scheme, which is the most well-known tag pollution immune
scheme taking advantage of homomorphic MACs and signature. Particularly, our
proposed scheme has a verification process almost 10 times faster than MacSig, and
achieves 25% less communication overhead than MacSig. Moreover, our scheme
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achieves almost 50% less key storage overhead at the source node and a significant
gain, in terms of the key storage overhead at each non-source node, compared to
the MacSig scheme.
– In the second part, we presented two schemes, called a null space homomorphic
Message Authentication Code scheme and an efficient null space homomorphic
Message Authentication Code scheme respectively. In the null space homomorphic
Message Authentication Code scheme, the main idea was based on the randomization
and the subspace properties of random network coding. In our proposed scheme, a
lightweight encryption overlay scheme was integrated to provide resistance against
data pollution and tag pollution attacks by using two types of tags (i.e., MACs
and D-MACs). In this scheme, the D-MACs are calculated based on null space
properties. We showed that our proposed scheme is efficient in computation, and
incurs less communication overhead and keys storage for encryptions/decryptions.
Finally, in the last scheme, we have proposed an efficient null space homomorphic
Message Authentication Code scheme. In the proposed scheme, to avoid tag
pollution attacks, each tag has not a fixed location in the coded packet. More
precisely, the tags are calculated based on null space properties and then, they are
secretly swapped with the packet data. Hence, they are not appended to the end of
the coded packet and thus, an adversary is not able to distinguish them from the
packet data. Our results show that the proposed scheme is more efficient compared
to the schemes proposed in [3] and [4], in terms of computational complexity without
incurring additional communication overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the
proposed schemes in [3] and [4] are the most competitive schemes in the literature
for providing resistance against tag pollution attacks in Random Linear Network
Coding (RLNC).
6.2 Future Research Directions
The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of wireless communications can raise many security
challenges. More precisely, NC-enabled wireless networks can be the target of a wide spectrum
of security attacks including eavesdropping attacks, Byzantine attacks, pollution attacks,
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and entropy attacks among others. In this sense, a lot of
effort has been placed on secure NC schemes against these types of attacks. However, in this
thesis, we only considered pollution attacks (i.e., data and tag pollution attacks). We now
give an overview of future lines of research based on the work presented in this thesis.
6.2.1 Other Threat Models and Techniques
In Chapters 4 and 5, we proposed several secure network coding-enabled wireless networks
schemes with two different pollution model scenarios: the first considers that the intermediate
nodes only make changes to a packet data that is transmitted in the network, and the second
assumes the attacker makes changes to the tags appended at the end of data packets. Therefore,
one direction for future work is to adapt our schemes to be resistance against entropy attacks.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, entropy attackers create and distribute coded packets that are
valid linear combinations of the native data. As a result, a pollution defense is not helpful
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against an entropy attack because all of the defenses against pollution attacks rely on the fact
that an invalid coded packet is not a valid linear combination.
S R1 R2 R3 R4
R5 R6 R7 R8
D1
D2
S R1 R2 R3 R4
R5 R6 R7 R8
D1
D2
Polluted PacketPacket
Packet
R4 asks R2 to resend the packet
Figure 6.1: A scenario of locating scheme. In top, the polluted packet is discarded by node
R4. However, in the lower diagram, instead of discarding the polluted packet who has been
polluted by R3, there is a possibility to detect the attacker and ask from at least one node
before the attacker (i.e., R2) to resend the unpolluted packet through R7. This leads to avoid
wasting the energy.
6.2.2 Key Distribution Model
Another security challenge lies in the fact that the key distribution model, which is adopted
in this thesis, is based on cover-free families [25,133] and is limited to a number of compromised
nodes considered in our proposed schemes. However, the techniques used to detect pollution
attacks in such scenarios must be independent to the number of adversaries. Thus, one
promising approach may lie to investigate the use of different key distribution models which
are not dependent on the number of compromised nodes.
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6.2.3 Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is of vital importance for wireless communications in future networks,
especially battery-constrained wireless and wireless sensor devices. In our proposed schemes
in this thesis, we focused on finding the polluted packets and discarded them so as to avoid
resource waste. However, in future, we could plan to not only detect the polluted packets, but
to also find the exact location of the attacker. This may avoid discarding the packets, and to
save energy. In this regard, we would like to consider the following schemes:
6.2.3.1 Locating Scheme
Since the proposed defense mechanisms against pollution attacks can be classified into three
categories: 1) error correction [16,118,139], 2) pollution detection [3,19,20,25,26,114,115],
and 3) polluters locations [104,123,140], we have studied only the pollution detection in this
thesis. In this regards, future work should be focused on locating the attackers. More precisely,
parents and children of any intermediate node cooperate to detect polluted packets sent by the
adversary. This locating scheme forces nodes in the network to truthfully cooperate to exactly
locate the pollution attackers. For instance, this scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. A packet
which is transmitted by the node S is polluted by node R3. In this case, a locating scheme
not only can detect the polluted packet, but also detect R3 as the adversary. Thus, instead of
discarding the packet by R4, it can ask from R2 to resend the packet through different routes
(i.e., R7).
6.2.3.2 Isolating Scheme
After detecting the polluters with locating schemes, it would be interesting to design a
scheme to isolate the polluting nodes from the rest of the network. This may also lead to
energy saving in the network. However, what would be the tradeoff between locating the
attackers and isolating the attackers?
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